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OF NO INTEREST: TRUTH, SUBSTANCE, AND BARGAIN
BORROWING
JOSEPH W. JACOBS*
INTRODUCTION
The steeper the tax rate, the greater the incentive to avoid it.
Algorithms for avoidance of a 4% sales tax will not keep bread on
a tax lawyer's table.' But where the tax rates soar to 84%, taxpay-
ers become eager, sometimes obsessed, to find ways to keep more
than their statutory 16%.
The sovereign, standing on the other side of the taxing transac-
tion, finds steep rates of tax harder to enforce. For example, sup-
pose King Arthur wishes to impose effectively an 84% tax on the
"value of all horses in the realm." If the tax is to be effective, King
Arthur must anticipate at least three schemes of avoidance. Some
subjects will move their horses out of the jurisdiction on the day
the tax is reckoned." Others will declare their horses to be of an
unrealistically low value. Finally, some may take to painting
stripes on their steeds and declare them to be zebras.3
Suppose, now, that just one of these schemes is effective to avoid
Arthur's 84%. For example, Arthur's decree is interpreted by the
courts to apply only to horses "physically living in the realm on
April 15th." One might expect massive migration to the adjoining
country on April 14th, followed by an equally massive return on
April 16th. So long as the total cost of the temporary excursion was
less than the tax sought to be imposed, we would expect most tax-
savvy subjects to join in this charade. The 84% tax would then
become nominal, or theoretical, for everyone in the realm would
learn to structure his affairs so as to avoid it. Only one such "loop-
hole" need exist for the bite of the tax to be eroded. Restated,
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.S.E.E., Lehigh
1966, LL.B., Yale, 1969. The author gratefully acknowledges the enduring assistance of Mr.
Jose Diez-Arguelles.
1. When the amount of sales tax becomes significant, some tax planning may become
useful. For example, on large consumer purchases, the local tax can often be avoided by
going to a neighboring state and having the merchandise delivered back home.
2. Many unsuccessful attempts have been made to avoid property taxes by simply mov-
ing the property outside the jurisdiction on the eve of taxday. See New York ex rel. N.Y.
Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 597 (1906) ("[Tjhe state of origin remains the
permanent situs of the property, notwithstanding its occasional excursions to foreign
parts."); see also Brock & Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 65 P.2d 791 (Cal. 1937); City of
Dallas v. Texas Prud. Ins. Co., 291 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1956); George F. Hazelwood Co. v.
Pitsenbarger, 141 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va.), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 201 (1965).
3. This assumes, of course, that zebras are subject to a lower tax rate, or none at all.
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Arthur must be constantly vigilant in plugging all loopholes as
they arise if his tax is to be a real one.'
Returning to the twentieth century, we find that the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) in fact seeks to impose, in two steps, a
tax reaching 84% on the profits realized by a corporation before
they are consumed by the owner-shareholders. If a corporation (X)
and its sole shareholder (A) are each in the highest applicable tax
bracket, $10,000 of corporate profit is taxed like this:
$10,000 business profit
- 4,600 corporation's income tax (46%)'
$ 5,400 corporation's after-tax profit
If this is distributed to A as a dividend, then:
$ 5,400 dividend to A
- 3,780 income tax on A's dividend (70%)"
$ 1,620
The government gets a total of $8,380 (84%) while the owner-
shareholder keeps only $1,620 (16%).1
Predictably, taxpayers subject to this tax seek ways to avoid it.
Predictably, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) resists
avoidance. Taxpayers might instinctively respond like King
Arthur's subjects. If so, they find that it does no good to flee the
country on April 15th,8 and that it is difficult to argue in earnest
4. If a second "loophole" opens, one would expect price competition between the two
species of loopholes. Suppose, for example, a corrupt collection system, where a bribe of two
gold pieces will result in the assessor's valuing the horse at 10% of fair market value. Citi-
zens have three options: first, pay the tax; second, take the two day excursion; and third,
pay two gold pieces plus 10% of the "real" tax bill. A rational taxpayer would choose which-
ever option minimized his out-of-pocket costs. The tour group operators would, in a perfect
market, find that their "original" loophole could be packaged and sold for no more than two
gold pieces plus 10% of the "real" tax.
In any event, the first loophole alone is sufficient to erode fully the tax, so long as the
"tour package" cost was less than the "real" tax.
5. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(5). Corporate taxable income in excess of $100,000 is taxed at a
46% rate.
6. See I.R.C. § 1(a). Individual taxable income in excess of $215,400 (for married people
filing joint returns) is taxed at a 70% rate.
7. Eighty-four percent is the high-water mark of the Code's ambition. Higher rates, such
as the 100% tax imposed in § 507(c)(for organizations flagrantly abusing the tax-free private
foundation status), are more akin to penalties than taxes.
8. The Code imposes a tax on the worldwide income of all U.S. citizens, wherever resi-.
dent, on April 15th or any other day. A citizen must expatriate, and also avoid "residence"
in the United States, if he is to avoid the U.S. income tax. Even expatriation is fraught with
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that the value of a $5,400 dividend is anything but $5,400.9 They
are left to seek ways to paint convincing stripes on the horse.
Stripe painting describes, albeit roughly, most popular schemes
designed to avoid this 84% tax. Their common denominator is dis-
guise. The dividend to the owner,' 0 the second of the two-steps, is
masqueraded as something else, a "zebra" subject to a lower tax
rate (or none at all). The most common forms of these "disguised"
dividends are: payment of excessive salaries to employee/share-
holders;" transfers of property between corporation and share-
holder at a price favoring the latter;" direct corporate payment of
shareholder expenses and obligations;' 3 and uncompensated use of
corporate property by shareholders."'
Rules have emerged facilitating the detection, valuation, and
taxation of disguised dividends. The rules are by no means perfect.
For example, a closely held corporation may successfully disguise
some dividend income as additional compensation income paid to
employees who are also shareholders. These schemes break down,
however, under the weight of too much disguise. Yet it is precisely
firms which are capable of generating "too much" dividend income,
those which are highly prosperous and which share that prosperity
with their owners, in which the tax rate reaches 84%.
All this leaves professional tax advisors in an uncomfortable
peril, see I.R.C. § 877, and is in any event a remedy too extreme for most taxpayers, regard-
less of the depth of their hatred towards the Service.
9. Property dividends offer some hope of circumvention, but this depends on declaring
the dividended property to be of an unrealistically low fair market value. See I.R.C.
§ 301(b)(1)(A). Taxpayer efforts here seem largely unsuccessful. See 1 MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 9.18.
10. Section 301(c)(1) of the Code provides that a distribution by a corporation to its
shareholders shall be included in the shareholders' gross income, but only to the extent that
the distribution is treated as a dividend under § 316(a). That section states that any distri-
bution to shareholders is treated as a dividend, but only to the extent of the amount of the
corporation's current, or accumulated, earnings and profits. Earnings and profits, a term not
defined in the Code, means roughly retained earnings.
If a distribution exceeds earnings and profits, § 301(c)(2) and (3) specify how the excess
shall be treated: first, as a return of capital to the extent of the shareholder's basis in his
stock; and second;, as capital gain, once basis has been reduced to zero.
It is assumed throughout this article, except where explicitly stated to the contrary, that
all distributions are made from earnings and profits and will, therefore, be includible in the
shareholder's gross income as a dividend. This permits the use of the term "dividend" in-
stead of the more cumbersome phrase "distribution to which section 301 applies."
11. See Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1142, 1155-56 (1980). See
also 1 MERTENS, supra note 9, at § 9.18.
12. See 1 MERTENS, supra note 9, at § 9.22 and cases cited therein.
13. See id. at § 9.08 and cases cited therein.
14. See International Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 94 (1970).
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spot. 5 The listed schemes of circumvention are extremely vulner-
able to attack by the Service. Tax lawyers think of themselves as
theoreticians, not cosmeticians. They yearn for a structurally
sound method of avoiding the 84% tax.
They find it in the interest-free shareholder loan (IFSL). An
IFSL is a presently invulnerable means of transferring corporate
wealth to shareholders without the imposition of a shareholder
level dividend tax.16 Even if an IFSL is detected and zealously pur-
sued by the Service, the shareholder risks only his defense costs.
This article is about interest-free shareholder loans, the safest
means of avoiding the stiffest tax rate in the Code. It begins with a
close look at interest-free loans and a tentative method for quanti-
fying their economic benefit. Part II argues that excluding the
IFSL's economic benefit cannot be justified on traditional policy
grounds. Part III reviews the case law mandating the exclusionary
treatment and may be conveniently skipped by readers familiar
with the subject. Finally, Part IV offers a simple proposal for tax-
ing their economic benefit.
I. THE VAL E OF INTERST-FREE BORROWING
That interest-free loans have some value is painfully obvious in
days of high interest rates. If a consumer is offered the option of
borrowing from either Lender A at 18% interest or Lender B at no
interest, he has little difficulty in selecting his creditor. The value
of bargain loans is recognized by the federal government, which
has turned increasingly towards low- or no-interest loans as a
mechanism for delivering federal subsidies. For the last two de-
15. Above all things, a tax attorney must be an indefatigable skeptic; he must dis-
count everything he hears and reads. The market place abounds with unsound
avoidance schemes which will not stand the test of objective analysis and litiga-
tion. The escaped tax, a favorite topic of conversation at the best clubs and the
most sumptuous pleasure resorts, expands with repetition into fantastic legends.
But clients want opinions with happy endings, and he smiles best who smiles last.
It is wiser to state misgivings at the beginning than to have to acknowledge them
ungracefully at the end. The tax adviser has, therefore, to spend a large part of his
time advising against schemes of this character. I sometimes think that the most
important word in his vocabulary is "No"; certainly he must frequently use this
word most emphatically when it will be an unwelcome answer to a valuable client,
and even when he knows that the client may shop for a more welcome answer in
other offices which are more interested in pleasing clients than they are in render-
ing sound opinions.
Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 412, 416 (1953) (footnote
omitted).
16. See generally cases discussed in Part III infra.
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cades subsidized housing legislation has relied heavily on the de-
vice of below-market-rate mortgage loans as the means for provid-
ing housing at below-market rents." Closer to the topic at hand, it
is becoming more widely recognized that tax shelter investments
are at bottom nothing but large interest-free loans from the gov-
ernment to the tax shelter participants.18 The price commanded
for the right to participate in these investments is strong evidence
of the intrinsic value of an interest-free loan.
The intuitive observation that interest-free loans have some ab-
stract value is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to sup-
port their inclusion in the borrower's gross income. If the interest-
free borrower is to be taxed, some dollar amount must be listed
somewhere on the borrower's Form 1040.
A. The Quantification of Value
A persuasive method for quantifying the economic benefit of an
IFSL has been suggested in a massive article by Professors Joyce
and Del Cotto,19, and is illustrated in the following example. Bor-
rower (B) finds Lender (L) offering to lend $100,000 for ten years,
without interest. B accepts, and receives $100,000 cash in exchange
for his note promising to pay L $100,000 a decade hence. Now let
us suppose for the moment that there exists one, and only one,
interest rate at any given time which all lenders charge all bor-
rowers in arm's-length lending transactions.2 0 This assumption, of
course, is at variance with economic reality, for interest rates in
commercial transactions made on a given day vary depending upon
the creditworthiness of the borrower (if there is some doubt as to
17. See, e.g., Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (1961); H. AARON,
SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES? 128-33 (1972).
18. "Tax postponement is equivalent to an unsecured, interest-free loan of indefinite
maturity made by the Treasury to the taxpayer." G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX
REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 62 (1975).
19. Joyce and Del Cotto, Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAX. L.
REV. 459, 460-62 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Odyssey].
Odyssey begins at roughly the same starting point as does this article, but the paths soon
diverge. Odyssey gives great emphasis to the estate and gift tax consequences of intra-family
interest-free loans. This article largely ignores gratuitous transactions, and emphasizes the
income tax consequences of business-motivated IFSL's.
The difference in paths involves more than fine pedagogical differences. The bottom line
results are exactly opposite. Odyssey, at 504-05, ultimately concludes that a demand IFSL
produces no adverse tax consequences to the borrower. See note 155, infra. This article
stresses that a demand IFSL produces dividend income to the borrower. See text accompa-
nying notes 137 to 170 infra.
20. This assumption is removed in Part IV.
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his ability to repay, then the lender imposes a higher interest rate
to compensate himself for the risk of repayment) 1 and on the term
of the loan (under recent market conditions long-term loans are
obtainable at an interest rate lower than that charged for short-
term loans).2 ' But for the moment the point to be made requires a
suspension of disbelief and the assumption that a single True In-
terest Rate (TIR) exists on a given day.
B may now figure out how much money he must place in a pass-
book savings account today such that it will grow to $100,000 in
ten years if all earned interest is accumulated. This, of course, de-
pends on the TIR. The higher the TIR, the more interest his initial
deposit will earn, and the less money is needed to reach the
$100,000 goal. To illustrate, if the TIR is today 12.794%, a deposit
of only $30,000 today will grow to $100,000 in a decade.2
By making this deposit, B may fully fund his obligation to repay
L. Indeed, he might wash his hands of the affair by delivering the
passbook to L and authorizing him to present it for payment a dec-
ade hence.2 4 B may now consume, without worry or obligation to
repay, the remaining $70,000.
Viewed another way, L could acquire a similar asset (someone's
21. [Bond] ratings are made by two major statistical organizations, Moody's and
Standard & Poor's, and they have been accorded official recognition. The ratings
designate the "intrinsic risks" which exist in a security, i.e., the degree of security
of principal and the likelihood of prompt payment of interest over a term of years.
Moody's Investors Service has 9 ratings running from the highest, Aaa, down to
the lowest, C. Standard & Poor's has 11 ratings previously running from Al down
to D, and now from AAA down to D.
B. GRAHAM, D. DODD, & S. Co'rr, SE.cuRrrY ANALYSIs 63 (1962) (footnote omitted).
22. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1981, at 35, col. 2. Presumably this reflects the mar-
ket's judgment that it is more likely than not that interest rates will fall in the future, so
that the short-term rates now available will later be unavailable to investors.
23. If $30,000 were invested in a passbook savings account guaranteeing a 12.794% an-
nual rate of interest, the $30,000 deposit would grow to $100,000 in ten years if each year's
interest is added to principal, and if the income tax imposed on the interest is disregarded.
On an annual basis the account would grow thusly; $30,000; $33,838; $38,167; $43,051;
$48,559; $54,772; $61,780; $69,684; $78,600; $88,657; $100,000. This ignores B's increased tax
liability resulting from the interest income. See note 24, infra.
24. At least two problems arise. The first is the risk of the Bank's solvency a decade
hence. B remains primarily liable on his $100,000 note, and if for some reason the Bank
failed to pay the $100,000 on maturity, B would be called upon to do so. B may minimize
this risk by careful choice of obligors (or ultimately by the purchase of Treasury bills). A
still skeptical B could probably procure insurance against the event of the Bank's nonpay-
ment. A second problem is that B would, under the facts supposed, realize income each year
in the amount of interest credited to his account, and would be forced to pay the resulting
tax liability from his other assets. This might be avoided by purchasing a note issued by an
individual satisfying the solvency considerations just raised. There is no original issue dis-
count on notes issued by individuals. I.R.C. § 1232(a).
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promise to pay $100,000, without interest, in ten years) for far less
money than the $100,000 he paid for B's note. The discipline of
finance tells us that under an assumed TIR of 12.794% "flat"
notes maturing for $100,000 in ten years would sell for $30,000.3'
Under the TIR assumption, all non-interest bearing notes - in-
cluding B's -maturing for $100,000 in 10 years have a fair market
value of $30,000.
Such "flat" notes seem to be enjoying a real world vogue on Wall
Street. On April 23, 1981 J.C. Penney Co. issued "zero coupon"
bonds, the first such public offering of non-interest bearing, long-
term corporate obligations.2' Each bond promised to pay the
holder a stated redemption price in 100 months, and nothing more.
The issue price was approximately 33% of redemption price (a
$1000 bond would sell for $330), for a yield to maturity of approxi-
mately 14.25%. s
25. The discipline of finance holds that a promise to pay money in the future will have a
market price equal to its "present value." For any interest-free obligation of a face amount
F, its present value (and therefore its fair market value) will be:
F
Present Value -
(1 + K)N
where K is the discount rate expressed as a decimal, and N is the number of years until
maturity.
Under the assumption of a TIR, the discount rate would necessarily be the TIR. Thus,
the price of a 10 year, $100,000 note would be, at a TIR of 12.794%:
$ 100,000
Present Value =
(1 + 0.12794)10
$ 100,000
1.1279410
$ 100,000
3.333
= $ 30,000
The higher the TIR, the larger the denominator and, for any given N, the smaller the pre-
sent value. In short, the higher the prevailing TIR, the lower the fair market value of B's
note. See generally ALCHIAN & ALLEN, UNIvrvsrrY ECONOMICS 179-185 (3d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as ALCHIAN & ALLEN].
26. See, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1981, at 45, col. 1.
27. See, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1981, at 45, col. 2. The Penney zero-coupon bonds suggest a
neat exploitation of the rules timing the borrower's deduction for interest. Under Code
§ 1232(b)(1), each bond contains original issue discount (OLD) of $670, or $6.70 per month.
The discount is deductible on a straight line basis by the issuer under Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4
(1971), while economically the interest expense accrues exponentially over the 81/3 year
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This conclusion might be drawn: the loan transaction between L
and B is not what it first appeared to be, but is instead a loan of
$30,000. The transfer of the other $70,000 from L to B is some-
thing else - maybe a gift, or a bribe, or a dividend. Whatever its
identity, this "side payment" of $70,000 is connected only cosmeti-
cally, and not integrally, with the loan. Indeed, it is no more a part
of the loan transaction than the quarter left by the tooth fairy is a
consideration paid for the acquisition of a molar. Loans are like
lunches: there is no such thing as a free one.
B. Discretionary vs. Compulsory Fragmentation
The last paragraph suggested one possible way of looking at the
transaction between B and L. It is now argued that courts should
take this view of bargain loan transactions.
One apparent impediment to the suggested treatment is this
well-established rule of law: Borrowing is not a taxable event.28 Re-
stated, when A borrows $10,000 from the Zed National Bank (Z), A
does not realize gross income of $10,000. Notwithstanding A's en-
hanced purchasing power, and notwithstanding the fact that these
$10,000 mix fungibly with taxable salary and investment dollars in
A's checking account, the law focuses on the fact that A has in-
curred an obligation to repay $10,000 in concluding that he has not
enjoyed any real "accession to wealth. '2' The act of borrowing
might give rise to later tax consequences. If A uses the $10,000 to
buy stock which he later sells for $15,000, his $5,000 profit is in-
term. Penney gets $330 today for its promise to pay $1,000 in 100 months. The market yield
is 14.25%. Economically, $330 times 14.25% (=$47) of interest obligation accrues in year
one. Penney's current deduction, however, is 12 x $6.70 = $80.
The Penney bondholder realizes $6.70 per month ($80 per year) of gross income under
Code § 1232(a)(3)(A) despite the fact that the holder receives no cash until 1989. One
assumes that pension funds and other tax exempt persons would be the most prominent
purchasers of the Penney bonds.
28. See B. BrrTKER, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 6-2 (1981).
29. Practical, not conceptual, difficulties prevent a contrary approach. If loans were gross
income (and a corresponding deduction were allowed in the year of repayment), lenders
would be forced to "gross up" the loan proceeds. To illustrate, if A were in the 50% tax
bracket and needed $10,000, then he must make provision for the $5,000 tax on his $10,000
of gross income. If he borrows this $5,000, then he would owe an additional $2,500. If he is
to borrow an amount sufficient to pay his tax bill and leave $10,000, he must borrow
$20,000. See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); I.R.C. § 902.
Presumably this would make borrowing much more expensive. Moreover, such a rule
could be manipulated by taxpayers with fluctuating incomes borrowing in loss years and
repaying in good years. This would produce de facto income averaging in contravention of
the specific (and limited) rules contained in I.R.C. §§ 1301-4. Although it is by no means
clear that these two results are undesirable, it is clear that the proposal is revolutionary.
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cluded in his gross income. And if A is released from his obligation
to repay for a consideration less than $10,000 (Z, for example,
might release A for $5,000 if A is in financial peril and an attempt
to enforce payment of $10,000 would not be wholly successful),
then A might be charged with discharge of indebtedness income in
the year of settlement.30
It is not suggested that the no-income-from-borrowing rule be
ignored or suspended. To the extent the transaction between L and
B is economically a loan (and not a side payment), the no-income-
from-borrowing rule prevails. It is here that an analogy from the
compensation area is helpful.
C. LoBue's Rule of Fragmentation
Another well-established tax rule is that the purchase of prop-
erty is not a taxable event. When the careful antique shopper buys
a Louis XIV commode from a seller ignorant of its value, he does
not recognize gross income in the amount by which the commode's
value exceeds its purchase price. 1 This result is tolerable because
the shopper will be taxed on the bargain element (and any post-
acquisition appreciation) when he sells or otherwise disposes of the
commode, for his basis in the commode is his cost, not its fair mar-
ket value.32
This basic rule is partially displaced when the seller turns out to
be the employer of the purchaser. The leading case is Commis-
sioner v. LoBue.83 The taxpayer, LoBue, was permitted, through
the exercise of an option, to purchase stock of his employer for
$1,700 when the fair market value of the stock was $9,930.84 The
basic question was whether LoBue realized $8,230 of compensation
income (the spread between fair market value and purchase price)
in the year of purchase.
30. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U.S. 1 (1931). The uncertainty in the text-"A might be charged"-is deliberate. Finan-
cially distressed debtors released for less than full payment often avoid discharge of indebt-
edness income. See, e.g., Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-12(b)(1953)(no discharge of indebtedness income in bankruptcy).
31. Cf. Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), a/f'd per curiam, 428
F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970) (Taxpayers found a treasure trove of cash in an old piano.).
32. I.R.C. § 1012. To illustrate, Shopper buys commode for $1,000. Its fair market value
is $10,000. Not taxing the buyer now is tolerable because when he sells for, say, $12,000, his
gain will be $11,000 ($12,000-$1,000 cost). I.R.C. § 1001(a).
33. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
34. 351 U.S. at 245.
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The Tax Court (the trial court in LoBue)85 had frequently con-
sidered the question of gain upon the exercise of employee stock
options. A peculiar test had emerged, turning on the "intention" of
the employer when it originally granted the option. If the employer
intended to grant the employee a proprietary interest - giving
him a piece of the rock with a view t6 obtaining the loyalty of a co-
owner - then the exercise of the option produced no gain. But if
the employer intended to compensate the employee, the latter re-
alized income in the amount of the bargain spread when he exer-
cised the option e6
Soon after this test was announced, lawyers began drafting stock
option plans with elaborate recitations of the employer's intention
to grant a proprietary interest in the firm. A brisk traffic in tax
avoidance on compensation income emerged. While it is true that
the employee would eventually pay tax on the bargain element, 7
he could both defer payment of the tax until he sold the stock and
then report his eventual profit as long-term capital gain."
When the Tax Court was presented with LoBue's case, it duti-
fully looked to the intention of the employer, found it to be propri-
etary and not compensatory, and held that the $8,230 bargain was
not income to LoBue. It admitted to some discomfort with its own
test: "[I]n practically all such cases as the one before use, both the
element of additional compensation and the granting of a proprie-
tary interest are present."' The Third Circuit, applying a clearly
erroneous standard, affirmed.40
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black,
holding that the $8,230 spread was includible in LoBue's gross in-
come. He reasoned:
1. The Code, through its definition of gross income,'1 seeks to
"'Tax all gains except those specifically exemapted'.'4 2
35. LoBue v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 440 (1954).
36. This "proprietary stock option rule," and its companion "compensatory stock option
rule," were established in Geeseman v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938). It flourished
until the Supreme Court's decision in LoBue.
37. See supra note 32.
38. Section 1202 of the Code allows the taxpayer to deduct 60% of net capital gain from
his gross income.
39. 22 T.C. at 445.
40. Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1955).
41. The definition of gross income was then contained in § 22(a) of the 1939 Code. The
current definition is contained in I.R.C. § 61.
42. 351 U.S. at 246 (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30
(1955)).
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2. The only arguable exemption is that of a gift, but to call such a
commercial transaction a gift strains credulity. Therefore,
3. "Since the employer's transfer of its stock to its employee Lo-
Bue for much less that the stock's value was not a gift, it seems
impossible to say that it was not compensation."48
When it was objected that this holding upset years of settled case
law and ignored the proprietary stock option doctrine, Mr. Justice
Black responded simply and elegantly: "In our view there is no
statutory basis for the test established by the courts below." Re-
stated, the Supreme Court will correct long-standing misapplica-
tions of the Code without doing violence to the idea of stare
decisis.4
The fundamental rule, no-income-from-the-purchase-of-prop-
erty, is undisturbed by LoBue. The Court holds that LoBue
bought $1,700 worth of stock for $1,700. But in addition, he re-
ceived $8,230 worth of stock as compensation, in recognition of his
value as an employee. ("It makes no difference that the compensa-
tion is paid in stock rather than in money.")" LoBue treated the
transaction as if it were just a purchase of stock. Mr. Justice Black,
attuned to the incestuous potential of employer-employee transac-
tions, comminutes i4 or breaks apart, the formally unitary transac-
43. 351 U.S. at 247.
44. Id.
45. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940). Mr. Justice Frankfurter there stated:
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It repre-
sents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to
satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and ques-
tionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more em-
bracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
... But certainly such inaction by the Treasury can hardly operate as a con-
trolling administrative practice, through acquiescence, tantamount to an estoppel
barring reexamination by this Court of distinctions which it had drawn. . . . Vari-
ous considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy must be suggested as rea-
sons for the inaction of the Treasury and of Congress, but they would only be
sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the ab-
sence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.
This Court, unlike the House of Lords, .... has from the beginning rejected a
doctrine of disability at self-correction.
Id. at 119-21 (footnotes omitted).
46. 351 U.S. at 247.
47. This descriptive, if rare, word enters tax law in Learned Hand's famous opinion in
Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945), "We have to decide only whether upon
the sale of a going business . . . [the purchase price] is to be comminuted into its frag-
ments." 152 F.2d at 572.
272 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:261
tion into its two component parts: a purchase of stock and a com-
pensatory side payment.
D. LoBue's More General Rule
From LoBue we may extract a more general rule for handling
incestuous property dealings, that is, transfers of property between
related parties. The parties to an incestuous transfer have no in-
centive to set the formal transfer price at fair market value. The
law must in these circumstances:
1. Determine the fair market value of the property being
transferred.
2. Compare that value with the consideration being paid (gener-
ally the dollar amount flowing from one party to the other).
3. If the value of the property exceeds the cash consideration,
then only that portion of the property's value equal to the cash
changing hands is being purchased. The remainder of the prop-
erty is a side payment made in kind. Its existence must be ex-
plained by looking beyond the terms of the property transfer to
the relationship of the parties.
4. If the cash consideration exceeds the value of the property,
then so much of the cash as equals the property's value is paid to
acquire the property. The excess is a side payment, and its exis-
tence must be explained by looking beyond the terms of the prop-
erty transfer to the relationship between the parties.
Paragraph 3 is, of course, the generalization describing the result
in LoBue. Paragraph 4 is the companion, symmetrical generaliza-
tion, not articulated in LoBue because the facts did not require it,
which should be applied to IFSL's.
Note that the Supreme Court holds that this comminution is re-
quired by the broad language of section 61. If an heretical practice
(such as the proprietary stock option doctrine) has developed in
the lower courts in contravention of this mandatory comminution
approach, it is the duty of appellate courts to suppress the heresy.
Restated, it is not a job for the legislature, for the legislature has
said all that need be said by enacting section 61."
48. This is not to say that the legislature may not act. It obviously may amend the Inter-
nal Revenue Code or even repeal it. Compare, I.R.C. §§ 482 and 483, discussed infra note
90. It is suggested only that there is a co-extensive power in the appellate courts, especially
in the Supreme Court, and in Congress to effect the advocated changes. See, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), supra, note 45.
It would seem, however, that even though both branches of government share the power
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E. Rethinking Bargain Loans
Applying the rule generalized from LoBue requires that we com-
minute the bargain loan into the "real" loan transaction and the
side payment.49 The property in question is the borrower's note;
the consideration is the amount of the loan proceeds.50 Returning
to L and B, the first question is the value of B's note promising to
pay L $100,000 in a decade. This was shown to be $30,000 if the
TIR is 12.794%. Next, we compare this to the cash consideration
changing hands - $100,000, the amount which B transfers to L in
exchange for his note. Applying Step 4, the cash exceeds the prop-
erty's value by $70,000. That is the side payment.
The structural similarity between LoBue and the IFSL transac-
tion is illustrated in Figure 1. The LoBue transaction is mapped in
the top pair of diagrams, with Ee designating LoBue the employee
and Er designating his employer. The bottom pair maps the
$100,000, 10-year, 12.794% IFSL transaction just described.
to make these structural adjustments to the tax laws, the courts are in a better position to
do so. Legislative intervention in this area would involve political considerations perhaps
not well suited to the resolution of highly technical questions of tax structure.
49. Odyssey, supra note 19, at 462-69, arrives at this point by seeking to accomplish the
comminution under imputation of interest principles analogous to those found in Code
§ 483: "The main burden of this portion of the article will be to state the position that the
theory of section 483 should be used to implement the [comminution] analysis .. " Odys-
sey at 462. This article argues that the imputation of interest is both unnecessary and mis-
leading. See note 51 and accompanying text, infra..
50. It is perhaps strange to think of the borrower's note as "property." A borrower about
to acquire other property (here cash) in exchange for his promissory note is in a position
analogous to that of the corporate employer in LoBue. The consideration paid in LoBue to
acquire the benefit of LoBue's services was stock of the employer, which has no value in the
hands of the issuer-employer. Similarly a promissory note has no real value in the hands of
a borrower prior to its issuance. There is no doubt, however, that both the note issued by
the borrower and the stock issued by the employer have value, and are property, in the
hands of the transferee. This issue is discussed again in note 141, infra.
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FIGURE 1
FORM: SUBSTANCE:
Sto
It must be stressed that this comminution analysis does not in-
volve the imputation of interest on B's note.61 It does not attempt
to describe what would happen if the loan bore an arm's-length
interest rate. Instead, it simply reflects the reality that a "flat"
note has a value less than its face amount and then acknowledges
that the flow of consideration in excess of value must be explained
by looking at factors external to the loan transaction - specifi-
cally, to the identity of the parties.
It is useful now to leave the assumed numbers (10-year term and
12.794% TIR), and see how comminution works for other terms
51. It will be seen in Part III that the case law tends to analyze IFSLs in terms of imput-
ing an arm's-length interest rate. See, text accompanying notes 88 to 130. The Tax Court
now maintains that taxing IFSLs requires imputation of interest so that any change in the
law must be pursuant to legislative intervention along the lines of I.R.C. § 482. See, Crown
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1064-65 (1977), afl'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
It may be true that only Congress may require the imputation of interest. But cf. Oester-
reich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955) and Commissioner v. wilshire Holding
Corp., 288 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1960) (imputing original issue discount without statutory au-thority). This article argues that the imputation of interest on IFSL's is both unnecessary to
their taxation and illogical.
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and TIR's. The admixture of real loan and side payment depends
on two things: the term of the loan (N) and the TIR. We know
that the loan amount and the side payment added together pro-
duces the dollars changing hands:
L + SP = Dollars
L, the fair market value of B's note, is:
L = Fair Market Value =Dollar Amount(1 + TIR)N
The effect of changing the two variables, N and TIR, is best dis-
played graphically. First the mixture of loan and side payment at
the assumed TIR of 12.794%, over different values of N:
FIGURE 2
Mixture of Loan and Side Payment for $100,000 IFSL of N-Year term(TIR = 12.794 percent)
Shaded portion - Loan
S Value
100,000
80,000;
40,000
0 5 10 15 20 N = Loan term In years
The shaded area indicates the portion which is the loan amount;
the white portion indicates the side payment. For any assumed
term of the loan (N), simply draw a line up to the curve, and then
back over to the vertical axis. As shown, a five-year loan is 55%
loan and 45% side payment. A fifteen-year loan is only 16% loan.
The remaining 84% is side payment.
The next graph holds the term constant at 10 years and shows
the different admixtures resulting from changes in the assumed
TIR:
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FIGURE 3
Mixture of Loan and Side Payment for $100,000, 10 Year IFSL at various
TIRs
Shaded portion = Loan
$ Value
80,000
0 5 10 15 20 25 TIR In percent
The lower the TIR, the greater the proportion of loan to side
payment.
As a general rule, then, the longer the term, or the higher the
TIR, or both, the more pronounced is the side payment. Indeed, at
high values for N or TIR, the loan component becomes trivial, the
tail wagging the dog of the side payment. This makes a certain
intuitive sense: How much would you, the reader, be willing to pay
now for the right to get $100,000 in 2001?
Finally, notice that this compulsory comminution rule does not
characterize the side payment. To do so we must examine the rela-
tionship between B and L. The following table becomes useful:
Nature of Relationship
Between B & L
Father-Child
Employer-Employee
Government Contractor-Bureaucrat
Corporation-Dominant Shareholder
Probable Identity of
Side Payment 52
Gift5s
Compensation 1
Bribe5 5
Dividend."'
52. The right-hand column is intuitive. Experience suggests these as the most likely ex-
planations (although in some cases it might be shown to be otherwise). Recall that Justice
Black resorted to intuition and commonsense in maintaining that "[i]t seems impossible to
say that it was not compensation." 351 U.S. at 247.
53. See, e.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1978).
54. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
55. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979).
56. See Part III, infra.
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F. The Logical Consequents - The Other Shoe Drops
Having comminuted the earlier property acquisition transaction,
one must be careful to remember this fact when the property is
sold. Consider first LoBue. The court held that he bought some
stock for $1,700, and received $8,230 worth of stock as compensa-
tion. Since his receipt of the compensatory stock was included in
gross income, he gets a "tax cost basis" in these shares equal to
their fair market value.57 He gets a $1,700 basis in the stock he
bought. The two bases together total $9,930, the fair market value
of all the shares on the date of their acquisition. If LoBue later
sells all the stock for $12,000, his gain will be $2,070 ($12,000 less
basis of $9 ,9 3 0 )." In the absence of earlier comminution his gain
would be $10,300 ($12,000 sales proceeds less pure cost basis of
$1,700).
A similar adjustment must be made if the bargain loan transac-
tion is comminuted. Returning to L and B, the loan amount is
$30,000; the other $70,000 is a side payment to be characterized in
accordance with the relationship between L and B. B, of course, is
called upon to repay $100,000 even though he borrowed only
$30,000. This additional $70,000 is simply interest accrued for ten
years, at the TIR, on his $30,000 loan (remember that B pays no
interest during the loan term)., B then receives a $70,000 interest
deduction when he repays the loan at maturity;60 and L receives
that much interest income at the same time." Notice that the
amount of B's eventual interest deduction ($70,000) in the year of
repayment is the same as the amount of the side payment in the
year of borrowing. If B remains in a constant tax bracket of, say,
50%, then he should pay a tax of $35,000 on the $70,000 side pay-
ment and realize a tax savings of $35,000 a decade hence when he
pays $70,000 of interest. Economically, he is forced to make an in-
terest-free loan to the government!
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1)(1957).
58. See I.R.C. § 1001.
59. See supra note 23.
60. I.R.C. § 163(a). It is assumed that both L and B use the cash basis of accounting.
61. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4). A more complex way to account for the interest is to charcterize the
$70,000 difference as original issue discount and give a deduction to B (and charge income
to L) at the rate of $7,000 per year. This would happen if B, the borrower, were a corpora-
tion. See I.R.C. § 1232(a).
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Justice Black's statement, quoted earlier,"s concerning Congress'
desire to tax all economic benefits except those specifically ex-
cluded, is a theme often sounded in Supreme Court tax cases.1e If
some economic benefit escapes tax, it must be because of either a
specific statutory mandate or some Other Compelling Reason. The
Code does not provide for the exclusion of IFSL's; the fact of their
exclusion must be based on some other compelling reason.
The Tax Court has found that the tax treatment of IFSL's is
"somewhat akin"" to the exclusion of certain fringe benefits.
These, too, are examples of economic benefits which escape taxa-
tion in apparent defiance of the Supreme Court's mandate of in-
clusion. An IFSL is not, strictly speaking, a fringe benefit, for this
term describes compensatory benefits. An IFSL is, by definition,
received by a shareholder as an incident of his investment activi-
ties, not his labor. Since there is no body of law governing fringe
benefits ancillary to income derived from capital, 5 the analogy
suggested by the Tax Court seems a useful starting point in the
search for the other compelling reason.
It has long been observed that certain fringe benefits realized by
employees escape taxation." The department store employee who
receives a 20% "courtesy discount" realizes no gross income when
he purchases merchandise at a discount notwithstanding the obvi-
ous parallel to LoBue.67 Nor is the airline employee taxed when he
flies for free." Considerable intellectual effort has gone into ex-
plaining these results in terms of the underlying policies of the law.
The intellectual effort is nowhere more apparent than in an un-
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text,
63. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955). See also James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218-19 (1961); Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956).
64. Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1013 (1979), appeal pending (5th Cir.).
65. Probably because the IFSL is the only significant example of this category. Compare,
"free" toasters for depositing $500 in a savings account.
66. See Discussion of Proposed Regulation § 1.61-16, [1975] FED. TAXES (P-H), 65,667
[hereinafter cited as 1975 Discussion].
67. Id. at 1 65,668. Cf. Discussion of Proposed Regulations on Fringe Benefits, [19801
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), 8991 at 77,844 [hereinafter cited as 1981 Discussion] (Pro-
posed § 1.61-19(b)(1) would exclude these discounts only if: (1) They are available to all
employees. (2) Prices paid cover employer's costs. (3) Total purchases don't exceed a certain
amount.).
68. 1975 Discussion, supra note 66, at 1 65,668. Cf. 1981 Discussion, supra note 67, at
1 77,840 (The value of the ticket minus the price paid is includable in gross income. Pro-
posed § 1.61-17(d), example 1.)
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usual discussion draft of proposed regulations on fringe benefits
issued by the Treasury in 1975.69 After candidly noting the dispar-
ity between pronouncement and practice, the preface proposes
that:
The statutory language (of section 61) should be viewed . . . as
broad authorization to reach such items as may be appropriate, in
the context of our overall system. It is clearly broad enough to
encompass almost any economic benefit, but it is equally clear
that it has not been construed to do so.70
The preface continues to articulate several policy considerations to
be applied in determining whether a particular fringe benefit
should be taxed or not.
A prominent policy factor is equity among taxpayers. "If all tax-
payers had fringe benefits or other benefits in kind and those bene-
fits were roughly in proportion to their other income, then the uni-
form exclusion of all such benefits from tax would be as equitable
as tax matters are likely ever to be . . . .,7 Free employee airline
travel and merchandise discounts are cited as the kinds of benefits
which may equitably be excluded from section 61's broad sweep.
This policy would tend to demand taxation of the IFSL's benefit.
The reported cases, as one would expect, suggest that such loans
are made only to dominant shareholders.s There is no hint that
the bookkeepers and laborers are customarily given the opportu-
nity to join the boss in borrowing without interest.
A second prominent factor in the Treasury's preface concerns
valuation problems. Many fringe benefits are very difficult to
value, and for that reason alone exclusion is warranted. "What is
the value to a stewardess of riding in an otherwise empty seat? '73
As will be shown in Part IV of this article, it is a relatively simple
exercise to measure the benefit conferred by bargain borrowing.
The exclusion of IFSL's may not be justified on this ground.
Of the six listed policy considerations, the law's present treat-
69. The Treasury Department issued a "Discussion Draft" prior to the regulations being
issued in proposed form. See supra note 66. Discussion was unfavorable. In 1978 Congress
imposed a moratorium on Treasury's power to issue regulations in the fringe benefit area.
Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1. Most recently, Treasury issued another set of proposed regulations
governing fringe benefits at the invitation of the House Ways and Means Committee. See
1981 Discussion, supra note 67.
70. 1975 Discussion, supra note 66, at 65,668.1.
71. Id. at V 65,668.4.
72. See Part III infra.
73. 1975 Discussion, supra note 66, at 65,668.4
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ment of IFSL's is supported only by the notion of continuity of
practice.7 4 This is a slender thread indeed upon which to base the
continued exclusion of IFSL's from the broad sweep of section 61.
To recapitulate the ground thus far covered:
-- IFSL's confer an economic benefit.
-- Under idealized conditions (an assumed TIR and a certain
term) this benefit may be quantified and thereby introduced onto
Form 1040.
-- The benefit is available only to a small segment of society,
those who are dominant shareholders in prosperous concerns.
(Only such firms having surplus cash to lend are in a position to
make IFSL's.)
-- The benefit is excluded from gross income, notwithstanding
the absence of either express authorization or strong policy
justifications.
-- The exclusion permits circumvention by the prosperous of the
84% tax on a shareholder's consumption of his firm's business
profits. And since it is only the prosperous who are subject to this
highest of tax rates, this rule of exclusion must seriously erode
the statutory mandate of an 84% tax.
We next turn to the case law in search of the missing other com-
pelling reason for the existence of this perplexing state of affairs.
III. THE CASE LAW
A. The Early Authority - Dean's Seductive Analogy
The Commissioner's first reported attack on the federal income
tax consequences of the IFSL surfaced in 1961, in the celebrated
opinion of Dean v. Commissioner.T The stakes were high, for the
74. The 1975 Discussion listed six policy considerations which were to be taken into ac-
count when determining which economic benefits were to be taxed: (1) Present practices in
general are codified. (2) Equity among taxpayers. (3) Valuation problems. (4) Statutory
authority is broad but not mandatorily all-encompassing. (5) Withholding considerations.
(6) Retroactivity. 1975 Discussion, supra note 66, at 65,668.3-.5. The first three considera-
tions have been discussed in the text, with only continuity of practice supporting the pre-
sent treatment of IFSL's. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Of the remaining
considerations, the magnitude of these IFSL transactions and the resulting taxes can easily
offset any practical difficulties associated with imposing these taxes. Reporting require-
ments, similar to those now in effect for dividend distributions, can remedy any collection
difficulties associated with the inability to collect through a withholding mechanism. And, as
has already been discussed, retroactivity, like stare decisis, "is a principle of policy and not
a mechanical formula of adherence." Hallock, supra note 45, at 119.
75. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), appeal dismissed per stipulation [1980] STAND. FED. TAX R"P.
(CCH) 1 90,735.
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taxpayers were duPonts and the deficiency exceeded $100,000 for
each of the two years in question.7 6 Briefly, Paulina duPont Dean
organized Nemours Corporation in 1924, receiving all its stock in
exchange for a variety of investment assets she conveyed to
Nemours." Her husband, J. Simpson Dean, later became a 20%
Nemours shareholder.7 8 Beginning in 1929 and continuing through
the years in issue, 1955 and 1956, the Deans established a pattern
of drawing interest-free loans from Nemours, always evidencing
their indebtedness with promissory notes payable upon Nemours'
demand. By 1955 their total combined borrowing from Nemours
totaled some $2.05 million; in 1956 this figure swelled to some
$2.66 million.7
The Commissioner argued that the loans produced income to the
Deans. He cited the well-established rule that uncompensated use
by a shareholder of corporate property results in constructive divi-
dend income measured by the fair rental value of the property for
the term of the shareholder's use.80 For example, if X Co. owns a
house in which it permits A, its shareholder, to live rent-free, then
A is deemed to receive dividend income in the amount which he
would have paid as rent to an unrelated owner in an arm's-length
leasing situation.81
Money, continued the argument, is corporate property, just like
houses, cars, yachts, and hunting lodges. An interest-free loan gives
the shareholder use of the money without charging him "rent" in
the form of interest. Thus, the Deans should be charged with con-
structive dividend income equal to the "fair rental value" of the $2
million-plus used by them in 1955 and 1956. This fair rental value
was stipulated to be the then 3-to-4% prime interest rate.8
The Tax Court, at the Deans' urging, distinguished the rent-free
cases as follows:
In each of [the rent-free cases] a benefit was conferred upon the
stockholder or officer in circumstances such that had the stock-
76. Id. The deficiencies-the Commissioner's formal determination of a tax owed in
addition to that reported in a taxpayer's return-were later reduced as a result of the par-
ties' stipulation of the controlling interest rate. Id. at 1087.
77. Nemours Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 585 (1962).
78. Id. at 585-86.
79. 35 T.C. at 1083. The numbers used here, and throughout this article, are generally
rounded-off to three significant figures.
80. Id. at 1089.
81. See International Artists, Ltd., supra note 14.
82. 35 T.C. at 1088.
19811
282 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:261
holder or officer undertaken to procure the same benefit by an
expenditure of money such expenditure would not have been de-
ductible by him. Here, on the other hand, had petitioners bor-
rowed the funds in question on interest-bearing notes, their pay-
ment of interest would have been fully deductible by them under
section 163, I.R.C. 1954. Not only would they not be charged with
the additional income in controversy herein, but they would have
a deduction equal to that very amount.88
Restated, interest is always deductible while rent (if paid for per-
sonal, as distinguished from business, purposes) is not." From this
observation, and without further explanation, the court concluded
broadly that "an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the
borrower." 5
The court, before reaching its conclusion, might profitably have
explored another ramification of its hypothetical interest-bearing
note. If the Deans had borrowed $2 million at 4% interest, they
would have been obligated to pay $80,000 of interest each year.
True, they would then receive no income as a result of their bor-
rowing (although Nemours would),86 and true they would receive
an interest expense deduction of $80,000 under section 163 of the
Code. But they would - and this the court fails to mention - be
out-of-pocket the $80,000 paid to Nemours, less the amount of
taxes saved by getting an $80,000 interest deduction.
To illustrate, if the Deans were in the 70% tax bracket, then
their annual out-of-pocket cost of arm's-length loan would be:
$ 80,000 Interest paid to Nemours (4% of $2 million)
- 56,000 Value of an $80,000 deduction to a 70% taxpayer
$ 24,000 Net Annual Loan Expense
Under the interest-free loan, the Deans have no annual loan ex-
pense. They are ahead by $24,000.
Had the court focused on this ramification, the next question
would have been: Now what? Charge the Deans with gross income
of $24,000? Or, if the point of the exercise were to simulate the
Deans' after-tax "bottom line" in an arm's-length loan, charge
them with just enough income to increase their tax bill by
$24,000?87
83. Id. at 1090.
84. Compare I.R.C. § 163(a) with I.R.C. § 262.
85. 35 T.C. at 1090 (footnote omitted).
86. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
87. This would require "grossing up." To achieve a $24,000 tax increase for a taxpayer in
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But these are things the court might have done. What it did was
to invoke a flawed analogy to justify its holding that an interest-
free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower. The flawed
analogy was the only explanation given, and we are set to wonder-
ing whether the flaw in the premise infects the validity of the
court's conclusion.
B. The 1979 Cases
The Commissioner waffled after losing Dean. An appeal was
taken to the Third Circuit, but a year later that was dismissed by
stipulation of the parties.88 Thirteen years after the opinion was
published, the Commissioner first announced his nonacquies-
cence.8s During the intervening years Congress passed legislation
imputing interest in certain kinds of transactions, but bargain loan
transactions were unaffected.90 In the meantime Dean had taken
root as good law.
But not without controversy: Many commentators criticized the
the 70% bracket, taxable income must be increased by the formula:
TaxIncrease = 0.70
$24,0000.70 $34,286
See also note 29 supra.
88. See supra note 75.
89. The Commissioner's nonacquiescence was announced in 1973. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
90. Section 483 of the Code was enacted February 26, 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 224.
This section governs deferred-payment sales of property, where the deferred payments con-
tain either no provision for interest or interest at a below-normal rate. The "safe harbor"
rate, the minimum interest rate which must be charged on deferred payments to avoid
§ 483, is adjusted from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is currently 6%.
Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.483-1(c)(2)(C) will, if adopted in final form, increase this
rate to 10% for sales occurring after September 29, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 57,739, 57,740 (1980).
If less than the safe harbor rate is specified by the parties to a deferred sales contract,
§ 483 operates to recast a portion of the payments as interest. See generally, S. Rep. No.
830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 505, 605-08. The legislation did
not encompass bargain borrowing, although it easily could have. The Committee Reports
contain no suggestion that this was even contemplated.
The other Code Section which might apply to recast bargain loans on an arm's length
basis is § 482. This section applies to impute an arm's-length interest rate, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-2(a)(1976), but only if the loan is between "two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses... owned or controlled . .. by the same interests." I.R.C. § 482. The common
control requirement is apparently not satisfied when the two "units" are an individual
shareholder and his controlled corporation. See B. BrrriKER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, at 15.06, pp. 15-20. For the view that
§ 483 principles should govern IFSL's, see Odyssey, supra note 19.
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decisions"; others embraced it and recommended exploitation of
91. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Dean expressed concern with the
majority's conclusion that the "payment of interest would have been fully deductible." Dean
at 1090. Both judges felt that this was an overgeneralization and both cited Code § 265,
which excludes from deductibility interest on indebtedness incurred to carry obligations
which pay tax-exempt interest, as an example of exceptions to the "wash" rule. See also
Duhl & Fine, Interest-Free Loans and the Tax Court: Is Dean Weakening Under IRS At-
tacks?, 51 J. TAx 322 (1979); Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans from
Corporations to Shareholders and from Employers to Employees, 19 B.C.L. REV. 231
(1978); Tax Consequences of an Interest Free Loan, 24 Loy. L. REV. 33, 47 n.76 (1978). But
advancing these no wash situations as exceptions to the basic rule is a mistake. The recogni-
tion of exceptions requires the tacit admission that the rule itself is valid. The purpose of
this article is to show that there should be no such rule. Discussion of possible uses of the
interest-free funds and deductions the borrower may become entitled to merely cloud the
basic issue: The beneficiary of an interest-free loan receives an economic benefit. This bene-
fit should be taxed.
Even assuming that the discussion of the § 265 nonwash is germane, the occurrence of
this situation is unlikely. Only the most daring of taxpayers would enter into a transaction
so clearly at cross purposes with § 265.
A more subtle, yet probably more pervasive failure to wash results when § 1348's "maxi-
tax" provisions come into play. If the recipient of the interest-free loan has compensation
income high enough to avail himself of the benefits of the 50% maximum tax on personal
services income, then as a general matter the inclusion-deduction approach will produce a
higher tax bill.
This results from the allocation mechanics of § 1348. Assume an individual has both sub-
stantial personal service income (salary), which is subject to the 50% maximum marginal
tax rate, and also substantial other income, subject to the 70% maximum marginal tax rate.
His itemized deductions are charged against personal service income (and therefore not
against the other income) by a ratio of personal service income to adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. § 1348(b)(2)(A). This allocation produces the failure to wash.
To illustrate, assume a married individual has $300,000 of personal service income (salary)
and $300,000 of dividend income. In addition, he has received substantial interest-free
shareholder loans from his closely-held corporation, which would produce an additional
$100,000 of constructive dividend income each year were the Commissioner's position in
Dean inflicted upon him. He has $100,000 of excess itemized deductions. Assuming his ad-
justed gross income to be $600,000, half or the excess itemized deductions are deducted
from his personal service income in arriving at personal service taxable income, the thing
which is subject to the maxi-tax. The other half reduces his dividend (other) income to
$250,000, all of which will be taxed at a 70% marginal rate. All but the first $60,000 of his
salary will be taxed at a fiat 50% rate. Ignoring the lower bracket relief, his tax is:
50% X ($300,000 - $50,000) = $125,000
70% X ($300,000 - $50,000) = $175,000
$300,000
If he is now charged with $100,000 of constructive dividend income and given an 'offsetting'
interest deduction under § 163, everything changes. The critical ratio for allocating deduc-
tions becomes $300,000 (personal service income) to $700,000 (adjusted gross income, now
reflecting the addition of $100,000 of dividend income). His tax, again ignoring the lower
brackets, is:
50% X ($300,000 - $86,000) = $107,000
70% X ($400,000 - $114,000) = $200,000
$307,000
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the interest-free loan as a device to avoid income and gift taxes."
The Commissioner still levied an occasional attack, but was an-
swered with Tax Court Memorandum decisions finding the contro-
versy controlled by Dean.9 Then, beginning in late 1979, a half-
dozen cases appeared in rapid succession.9 4 Most simply affirm
Dean, but two, Greenspun v. Commissioner and Creel v. Commis-
sioner merit separate attention.
The first case came from Las Vegas. s The borrower was Herman
Greenspun, a Las Vegas newspaper/television magnate, who
needed cash to replace printing presses destroyed in an uninsured
fire. The lender was Hughes Tool Company (Toolco), the corporate
entity which Howard Hughes used to purchase, as the court put it,
"friendly press coverage"" on the occasion of his celebrated 1966
move to Las Vegas.
The $4 million loan amount was agreed upon quickly; the repay-
ment provisions and the interest rate were the product of extended
negotiations. After the Hughes people rejected an interest-free
loan because "the Internal Revenue Service might .. .question
the transaction, 9 7 the parties agreed to a 3% interest rate, half of
the 6% rate which the court found a bank would have charged
The change in tax liability here is more subtle than in the § 265 example. There the failure
to wash resulted from a supposed failure of deductibility of the constructive interest pay-
ment. Here, the deduction is allowed, but the effect is to change the marginal tax rate on a
certain tranche of income from 50 to 70%.
92. See, e.g., Burke, Interest-Free Loans-A Valuable Family Tax Planning Tool?, 48
TAXES 137 (1970). But see, e.g., O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L.
REV. 1085 (1974).
93. E.g., Suttle v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1638 (1978); Joseph Lupowitz Sons,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1972); Cf., Lisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 627 (1976) (distinguishing Dean on the facts).
94. See Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. - (No. 11, Oct. 22, 1980); Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Creel v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), appeal
pending, (5th Cir.); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979); Trowbridge v. Commis-
sioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1302 (1981); Estate of Liechtung v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1118 (1980); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979).
95. Greenspun, 72 T.C. 931 (1979).
96. Id. at 934. Greenspun's editorial policy found no fault with Hughes. The passages
quoted in the court's opinion are almost embarrassing in their lack of objectivity. Compare,
W. SHIRER, RiSE AND FALL OF THE THiRD REICH 118-49 (1960).
97. Greenspun at 934. The opinion does not discuss the basis of the Hughes people's
concerns. Dean was good law in 1966, and would suggest that the interest-free loan was
permissible. Even if Dean did not control (either because Greenspun borrowed on a term
note, or because his disguised side payment was compensatory in nature), the risk that in-
terest would be imputed would be borne by Greenspun, not Hughes. It may well be that the
Hughes people were imagining tax problems where none existed, so as to negotiate at least
some interest on the Greenspun loan.
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Greenspun. The original 1967 repayment schedule was amended in
1969, as a part of Toolco's purchase of certain Greenspun real es-
tate holdings.98 Under the more generous amended schedule, re-
payment of principal began 13 years and ended 33 years from the
anniversary of the original 1967 loan transaction.99
The Service did not question the bona fides of Greenspun's
promise to repay Toolco, or otherwise deny that the transaction
involved a legitimate loan. Instead, the Service maintained that
the $4 million loan proceeds included a disguised compensatory
side payment, made in consideration of Greenspun's friendly press
coverage of the Advent of Hughes. It was this compensatory side
payment which, in the Service's view, produced gross income to
Greenspun. 00
More precisely the Service maintained that Greenspun's com-
pensatory side payment came in two chunks, one in 1967 when
Greenspun received the $4 million loan proceeds, and another in
1969 when the repayment schedule was extended into the 21st
century.
The 1967 chunk was measured at some $700,000, "by first com-
puting the annual difference, or savings, between the 3% rate
charged by Toolco and a 6% rate taking into account projected
payments of principal. Respondent then totaled the present value
of the expected annual savings over the term of the loan."'01 The
1969 chunk of some $1.5 million was figured the same way.10 2
By this discounting of the present value of the interest savings
over the term of the loan the Service has, in effect, resorted to the
valuation approach suggested in Part i of this article. This point is
best illustrated by returning to a variation of the $100,000 ten-year
loan transaction between B and L. The variations are: first, an as-
sumed TIR of 6% (instead of 12.794%); and second, B's assumed
obligation to pay interest of 3% (instead of 0%) per year. The
B & L transaction now more closely parallels the Greenspun/
Toolco loan.
B's promise to repay $100,000 is now enhanced by his further
agreement to pay $3,000 per year in interest for each of the ten
years in which the principal is outstanding. Clearly, B's note evi-
dencing this undertaking is more valuable than one providing for
98. Id. at 937.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 940-41.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 941.
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no interest payments over the loan term, but equally clearly it is
less valuable than a note providing for annual interest payments at
the TIR of 6%. The discipline of finance tells us that the value of
B's 3 % note will be the sum of: (i) the present value of the right to
receive $100,000 in ten years (this is the same as the present value
of a noninterest bearing note); plus (ii) the present value of the
right to receive a 10-year annuity of $3,000 per year.10 Under the
TIR assumption, the discount rate must equal 6% so that B's note
will be worth: $55,800 + $22,000 = $77,800. Invoking LoBue's rule
of comminution, we would find that the $100,000 transfer from L
to B consisted of a loan of $77,800, plus a side payment of $22,200.
The Service's approach in Greenspun produces the same dollar
amount of side payment. The Service would focus on B's annual
"interest savings." At the TIR of 6%, B would have paid $6,000
per year interest. Under the loan as drafted B pays $3,000 per year
interest. The difference, $3,000 per year, is B's "expected annual
savings." The present value of this savings is, discounted at the
TIR of 6%, $22,000. The drawback of this approach is that we are
not told why this present value calculation is being made.
If the Service had phrased its attack by emphasizing the value of
Greenspun's note, not the value of the interest savings, then per-
haps the court would have been persuaded to find gross income
under a comminution approach. But the argument, as presented,
failed. The court agreed with the Service that the loan transaction
included a side payment and apparently agreed with the Service's
measurement of that side payment. It held, however, that the side
payment did not give rise to gross income. Its conclusion was based
squarely upon Dean.104
The court returned to Dean's seductive analogy, but this time it
added a new twist to the hypothetical arm's-length loan:
Underlying this reasoning [in Dean] was the idea that, economi-
cally speaking, an interest-free loan from a corporation to its
shareholder or employee is in substance no different from the
making of a loan on which interest is charged accompanied by an
increase in dividends or compensation in an amount equal to the
interest charged. Consequently, to give effect to the economic re-
ality of the situation, we attempted in Dean to equalize the tax
treatment of the two loan transactions. 0 5
103. See generally ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 25.
104. 72 T.C. at 947-52.
105. Id. at 947-48.
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The new twist is the "increase in dividends or compensation." If
the Deans had caused Nemours to declare dividends sufficient to
pay an arm's-length interest charge on their $2 million plus loan
balance, then the Deans would in fact incur no out-of-pocket loan
expense. They would receive funds from Nemours as dividend in-
come, and return the same funds to Nemours as interest expense.
The Deans would be out-of-pocket nothing. Moreover, for tax pur-
poses the two transactions would "wash": 0 6 the dividend income
of $80,000 would be offset by an interest deduction of $80,000.
This new twist seems, then, to cure the flaw in Dean.
Closer inspection demonstrates otherwise. The court in Green-
spun states that Dean "attempted. . .to equalize the tax treat-
ment of the two loan transactions. '10 7 The "equalizer" is the added
twist of the hypothetical dividend. But by "equalizing" the bor-
rower's side of the transaction, the lender's side is thrown into
severe disorder. Using the same facts, the interest expense paid by
the Deans (and deductible by them) is interest income to
Nemours. But the dividend income realized by the Deans is not
deductible by Nemours. A corporation does not receive a deduction
for dividends paid to it shareholders. The net effect of the transac-
tion is an $80,000 increase in Nemour's taxable income, as com-
pared with its taxable income in an IFSL situation. The asserted
equivalence simply isn't so. But again, in the tradition of Dean, the
Tax Court stops one step short in exploring the ramifications of its
analogy, thereby conveniently ignoring the structural dissimilarity
between the two "equivalent" loan transactions.10 8
The court's reasoning is flawed in another, more fundamental,
respect. To effect the alternative loan transaction, the lawyers
must draft both: (i) a compensation agreement ("In consideration
for services performed, Toolco will pay Greenspun (or his heirs)
$120,000109 per year until 1980, and then specified lesser amounts
until 2004.") and (ii) a note bearing 6% interest.
The risk that both series of payments would continue without
106. See supra note 91.
107. 72 T.C. at 948.
108. Greenspun was the ideal case to introduce the added twist. The additional payment
to Greenspun would be compensatory; the additional payment to the Deans would be classi-
fied as a dividend. Toolco could deduct the additional compensation payment to Greenspun
under I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). As stated in the text, Nemours could not deduct dividends paid to
the Deans.
109. The loan amount was $4 million, on which Greenspun promised to pay 3% interest,
at a time when the going prime rate was 6%. The additional compensation would be 3% of
the total loan amount of $4 million.
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interruption for thirty years-presumably beyond the lives of both
Hughes and Greenspun-seems substantial. The two promises are
independent. For example, after Hughes' death, Toolco might fac-
tor Greenspun's note to an independent bank and stop paying on
the deferred compensation agreement raising the defenses of ultra
vires, unconscionability, failure of consideration, and public policy.
On the other hand, Greenspun (and his heirs) would be unsecured
creditors of Toolco, and would bear a long-term risk of its sol-
vency. Either series of payments is subject to a real risk of
interruption.
If the two documents - the note and deferred compensation
agreement - were so well drafted as to preclude the mutual inde-
pendence of their promises to pay, it is more appropriate to char-
acterize the resulting arrangement as being in substance a 3 % loan
from Toolco to Greenspun, with the rococo filigree of a check -
immune to all creditor's claims - making a quick loop out from
Toolco, through Greenspun's account and back to rest in Toolco.110
110. The classic authority for ignoring such "shuffling" of payments is Waterman Steam-
ship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970). Waterman resolved to sell to
McLean businesses conducted through two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Pan-Atlantic and
Gulf Florida, with which it filed a consolidated return. The negotiated purchase price was
some $3.5 million, a figure less than the subsidiaries' basis in their own assets but far in
excess of Waterman's $700,000 basis in the subsidiaries' stock. Non-tax considerations pre-
vented Waterman from first liquidating the subsidiaries and then selling the assets to Mc-
Lean, a structure which would produce no tax liability. Instead the deal was structured as a
sale of stock to McLean, potentially resulting in a taxable long-term capital of some $2.8
million to Waterman. To avoid this gain, Waterman caused Pan-Atlantic to distribute to it,
as a dividend, the subsidiary's promissory note for some $2.8 million. Immediately after-
wards, Waterman sold the Pan-Atlantic Stock to McLean for some $700,000 (its basis) and
then McLean (now Pan-Atlantic's owner) advanced Pan-Atlantic $2.8 million, which it in
turn used to pay off its promissory note. The form of the transaction, if respected, would
result in no tax liability to Waterman: its receipt of the note would be excluded from income
as an inter-company dividend under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a) (1969); the stock sale would
produce no gain realized (since the amount realized of $700,000 equaled Waterman's ad-
justed basis); and the satisfaction of the note in cash would likewise be non-taxable.
The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court's opinion upholding the structure of the
deal, held "that in substance Pan-Atlantic neither declared nor paid a dividend to Water-
man, but rather acted as a mere conduit for the payment of the purchase price to Water-
man." 430 F.2d at 1192. In other words, the quick excursion of the funds into, and then out
of, corporate solution was ignored. For a thoughtful criticism of Waterman, see Kingson,
The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861 (1976).
Another illustration is found in Flower v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 140 (1973). Flower, a
traveling salesman, incurred substantial away-from-home expenses for travel, meals and
lodging. He paid for these expenses out of his own pocket, but with an understanding that
the manufacturer whose wares he peddled would reimburse Flower upon his retirement in
ten equal annual installments. Flower claimed the expenses as deductions under § 162 of the
Code (and presumably was prepared to include the reimbursements in gross income upon
retirement). The court disagreed, holding that the understanding with respect to reimburse-
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The court's analogy is flawed in a third respect. If the court were
to hold that Greenspun realized 1967 compensation income mea-
sured by the present value of his "interest savings," no offsetting
1967 interest expense deduction results. Even if there were a nulli-
fication of gross income in cases like Dean, where the Commis-
sioner argues that the income is realized by the taxpayer year-by-
year over the term of the loan, Greenspun involves something else.
This theoretical problem was addressed towards the end of the
opinion:
[Respondent] asserts that petitioner was in full realization of the
total economic benefit to be derived over the original 8-year term
of the loan in 1967, the year the loan was first granted ....
[R]espondent [further] argues petitioner is not entitled to any
offsetting deductions under section 163(a) because he has not ac-
tually paid any interest.111
To support its argument, the Service invoked an analogy contain-
ing a self-destructive seed. Again, in the best tradition of Dean, the
Service attempted to demonstrate the economic reality of the
Greenspun/Toolco transaction by analogizing it to something else.
If after borrowing the $4 million from Toolco, Greenspun had
"subsequently entered into an arm's-length agreement allowing a
third party the use of $4 million under the same repayment sched-
ule on which he had agreed with Toolco," then the proceeds (ar-
gued the Service) would be income to Greenspun.
The court agreed with the Service that "if petitioner were to ac-
celerate the realization process by selling his rights under the loan
agreement to a third party, the sale proceeds would be immedi-
ately subject to taxation. ' 112 Just why this is true is left unex-
plained.113 No matter, however, for the court disposed of the entire
ment precluded any deduction. "[S]uch expenditures are in the nature of loans or advance-
ments and are not deductible as business expenses." 61 T.C. at 154-55. Again, the equal and
opposite component parts are ignored, and the end result controls.
111. 72 T.C. at 950.
112. Id. at 950-51.
113. This analogy is flawed in several respects. Presumably the assignment of loan pro-
ceeds contemplated by this example would not work a novation of the obligation, so that
Greenspun would remain liable on the original Toolco note. Greenspun's premium received
from the third party would be encumbered by a contingent liability to Toolco. Moreover,
the sale of rights under the Toolco note should produce short-term capital gain (instead of
compensation income) to Greenspun. Finally, if the relending of proceeds by Greenspun is
logically relevant to the issue of whether or not the original borrowing is a taxable event,
then why does the court fail to address the fact that about one-third of the proceeds were in
fact lent by Greenspun to his newspaper company?
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argument with: "[T]hat is not what occurred."1" '
C. Joseph Creel
A month after Greenspun, with another unfavorable decision in
the interim,"" the Tax Court finally gave the Commissioner some
semblance of a victory in Creel v. Commissioner1 . The case, as-
signed to Judge Sterrett, was factually unexceptional. Creel and
Jonnie Parkinson conducted active businesses through three sepa-
rate corporations. The two shareholders owned between them all of
the stock of each firm.117 During 1973 and 1974 Creel and Parkin-
son maintained open account interest-free loan balances from each
of the three entities, the lion's share coming from Gulf Paving.118
The indebtedness to Gulf Paving fluctuated from month to month
without discernible synchronization between the two shareholders;
the indebtedness to the other two corporations remained substan-
tially level during the two disputed years. " The loan proceeds
were used to pay shareholder living expenses and other personal
obligations. 20 By Dean standards the loans were small, never ag-
gregating more than $400,000."11
The Commissioner calculated the deficiency as in Dean: con-
structive dividend income measured by the product of the loan
balance times a stipulated interest rate, realized ratably over the
term of the loans. He advanced two arguments: first, Dean is
wrong and should be reversed; and second, Dean should be distin-
guished because of "the existence of corporate obligations guaran-
teed by petitioners for amounts in excess of the amounts petition-
ers borrowed from the corporations."' 122 This second argument was
supported by a showing that Gulf Paving owed - and the share
holders guaranteed repayment of - some $750,000 to banks and
114. 72 T.C. at 951. In the course of three paragraphs the court considers one real trans-
action (the actual three-percent loan transaction), and two hypotheticals: First, the Service's
accelerated realization hypothesis; and second, the court's own additional compensation/
additional interest deduction hypothesis. The reality is compared to both hypotheticals. The
first is rejected because it didn't happen; the second is embraced as the true substance of
the deal. We are left to wonder why.
115. Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), appeal pending (5th Cir.).
116. 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), appeal pending (5th Cir.).
117. Id. at 1175.
118. Id. at 1175-76.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1177.
121. Id. at 1175-76.
122. Id. at 1178 (Creel Ct. quoting respondent).
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finance companies.
128
Judge Sterrett disposed of the first argument in short order:
"We again decline . . . respondent's invitation to reverse our deci-
sion in Dean. Since that holding, Congress has not passed any en-
abling statute (a la section 482) creating income where none ex-
ists."1 2 Were the opinion to end there with the customary Rule
155 benediction,' 5 the Commissioner would simply be armed with
three fresh defeats useful in demonstrating to Congress the need
for corrective legislation.
But Judge Sterrett continued. The Commissioner's other argu-
ment, that the presence of shareholder-guaranteed borrowings by
Gulf Paving should be the basis of a legal as well as a factual dis-
tinction of Dean, prevailed. After noting that Gulf Paving's total
level of arm's-length borrowings substantially exceeded its total
level of aggregate shareholder lending, 2 Judge Sterrett's opinion
concludes with a bombshell:
We think the conclusion inescapable that, to the extent that it
had made interest-free loans to petitioners, Gulf Paving, Inc., was
required to carry interest-bearing obligations to third parties. We
believe and hold, therefore, that the substance of the transaction
before us was that Gulf Paving, Inc., acted as petitioners' agent in
obtaining loans from its various creditors to petitioners, and that
it paid interest to these creditors on behalf of petitioner. The re-
ality of this holding is made evident, or at least reinforced, by the
fact that petitioners were required to guarantee Gulf Paving,
Inc.'s loans during the taxable years before us. Thus, we conclude
that Gulf Paving, Inc.'s payment of that amount of interest allo-
cable to its interest-free loans .to petitioners was actually a dis-
charge by Gulf Paving, Inc., of petitioners' own obligations. To
the extent that these actual payments were in fact made during
the taxable years in issue, the taxpayers are deemed to have both
received dividend income and made an interest payment. Of
course, to the extent petitioners' total interest-free loans during
the taxable years before us exceeded their interest-free loans from
123. Id. at 1177.
124. Id. at 1179.
125. U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & P. 155. The court, after rendering its decision, leaves it to the
parties to determine the exact amount of the deficiency or overpayment, within the para-
meters of the decision.
126. At the end of 1973 and 1974 Gulf Paving's shareholder-guaranteed indebtedness
was some $750,000 and $825,000, respectively. Total shareholder loans were some $150,000
at the end of 1973 and some $110,000 at the end of 1974. 72 T.C. at 1175-77.
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Gulf Paving, Inc., these loans have no direct tax effect.127
To analyze the implications of this final paragraph would occupy
several pages of an article already dangerously long. Thus, some
questions are raised but not pursued.
The penultimate sentence suggests that the borrowers do realize
dividend income as a result of their IFSL's, yet at the same time
states that they are "deemed" to have made an interest payment.
But on which loan? Are they deemed to have paid interest on the
loans which they guaranteed, as is strongly implied in the second
quoted sentence?128 Or are they deemed to have paid a hypotheti-
cal arm's-length interest charge on their IFSL's, in which case the
dividend and interest payments would wash out. If the interest is
paid on the guaranteed loans, then the dividend income and inter-
est deduction would be different numbers, producing some "di-
rect" tax effect. A third possible interpretation is that the dividend
realized by the shareholders is measured by the payments made by
Gulf Paving to its creditors, on the theory that Gulf Paving was
paying its shareholders' bills (recall the second sentence suggesting
that Gulf Paving acted as agent for its shareholders in arranging
what are "in substance" loans by the outside creditors to the
shareholders). Under this interpretation, the effect of the decision
is to impose an excise tax on IFSL's measured by a wholly alien
yardstick: The amount of annual debt service on shareholder-guar-
anteed corporate borrowing.
Pending clarification of this paragraph when the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals issues its opinion in Creel, there is a strong sug-
gestion of change in the law. Dean is now tarnished, for IFSL's
made to shareholders who are also guarantors of corporate indebt-
edness may no longer be blessed with an unqualified opinion that
they fit within Dean's loophole.
There is a certain irony here. A closely-held corporation nor-
mally borrows money, or receives credit. Creditors, having heard of
the limited liability feature of corporations, more or less routinely
request a shareholder guaranty of significant indebtedness."" But
127. Id. at 1179-80 (emphasis supplied).
128. Compare Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967)
with Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1076 (1972) and with Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9 (1980). These authorities all permit
shareholder guaranteed corporate borrowing to be treated as "in substance" obligations of
the shareholder, but only in cases of very thinly capitalized corporations. There is no sug-
gestion of ultra-thin capitalization in Creel's findings of fact.
129. See generally, Z. CAvITcH, 4A BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 91.04[2] (1981).
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if the assets and net worth of the closely-held corporation are suffi-
ciently great, the creditors presumably would be more receptive to
a requested waiver of the guaranty. Creel, then, may simply re-
move access to the Dean loophole from all but the fabulously
wealthy, those owning Nemours instead of Gulf Paving. This
neatly stands on its head the prevailing tax policy that the more
discriminatory the availability of a fringe benefit, the less justifica-
tion for its exclusion from gross income. 180
IV. A TRACTABLE METHOD FOR VALUING IFSL's
This article has argued that Dean is wrong, and that the law
should change to require the bargain borrower to recognize his eco-
nomic benefit as gross income. Taxing the bargain borrower re-
quires that his benefit be valued, quantified in some fair and read-
ily ascertainable way so as to permit the entry of a dollar amount
on the borrower's Form 1040.
Part I demonstrated that a bargain loan may be comminuted
into a real loan and a side payment by determining the fair market
value of the borrower's promissory note, using the formula:
Face Amount
Value =
(1 + TIR)N
The time has come to address two realities: first, there is no such
thing as a TIR; and second, the formula does not tell us how to
value a demand note.
Both of these are somewhat formidable barriers to the taxation
of bargain borrowrs. We must ask: Should the administrative diffi-
culty of valuing real world IFSL's, especially demand IFSL's, jus-
tify their exclusion? The Treasury Department's 1975 policy analy-
sis of fringe benefits once again offers guidance in answering the
question:
Valuation of benefits in kind is extremely difficult in many, if not
most cases, and the necessity for valuation vastly complicates the
tax law .... In general it is desirable to avoid the complications
of taxing such items, unless their omission constitutes a serious
threat to the tax base or creates inequities that are significant in
the context of the system as a whole. 81
130. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
131. 1975 Discussion, supra note 66, at 65,668.4-.5 (emphasis added).
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The emphasized portion could not better describe the treatment of
IFSL's under Dean. They are now the one structurally sound way
of avoiding the shareholder dividend tax. Only one loophole need
exist if King Arthur's tax is to be avoided;8 2 similarly, IFSL's are
now an extremely serious threat to the tax base. The administra-
tive burden of valuation must be intolerably high if it is to out-
weigh the interest of preserving an uneroded tax base.
The remainder of this article suggests a surprisingly simple
means of addressing the valuation question. Analysis now gives
way to advocacy. The suggested approach to valuation admittedly
is neither conceptually perfect nor logically ineluctable. Impreci-
sion is introduced in order to achieve simplification. Alternative
approaches are suggested in the footnotes.
A. The TIR Problem
The reason for valuing the borrower's note is to permit the bar-
gain loan transaction to be comminuted into the "real" loan and
the side payment. The real loan amount is the value of B's note. In
an arm's-length market B's note would sell at a price such that the
holder would receive adequate compensation for his initial invest-
ment (the price he pays for B's note) when B repays the $100,000
on the maturity date. This $100,000 must include interest on the
original investment, plus interest on the interest which accrues
(but is not paid) over the term of the loan. This requires, as stated
earlier,18 8 compounding under the formula:
Value =Face Amount(1 + k)N
The interest rate, k, is the measure of the rate at which the holder
of B's note is earning interest.
Earlier, we avoided the problem of assigning a value to k by as-
suming a nonexistent TIR. We must now decide how to determine,
in some simple but accurate way, what value of k to use for a par-
ticular borrowing shareholder. Restated, how may we determine
what k the market would assign to the particular shareholder?
This k, or market interest rate, is a function of two factors: the
current "rock bottom" interest rates being charged impeccable
borrowers as a result of market forces governing supply and de-
mand for money; and second, the credit-worthiness of the particu-
132. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 25.
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lar borrower. This second factor could only increase k (and thereby
produce more income to the borrower). It could never lower k, for
by definition the starting point is the best market interest rate
available.
The first element, the rock bottom interest rate is easily figured.
It is universally conceded that the Treasury is the prime borrower
in this country.1 3 4 The yield on long-term Treasury bonds is pub-
lished daily in the Wall Street Journal. It is the second factor, the
interest "add-on" for the particular borrower, that is troublesome.
How may the Service determine, except on a case-by-case basis,
the amount of this add-on?
In order to avoid the inevitable disputes over the magnitude of
the borrower's add-on, we should ignore it. The Treasury might
simply take this position in its instructions accompanying Form
1040:
If, during the taxable year, you borrowed funds for a certain term
pursuant to an IFSL, then you must determine the fair market
value of the promissory note you issued, and report the difference
between the loan proceeds and the fair market value as dividend
income. You may determine the fair market value of the note by
using the formula:
Amount Borrowed
Value of your note = (1 + TBIR)N
N is the term, in years, of your note. TBIR is the interest rate,
expressed as a decimal, which the Treasury Department's bonds
of a term similar to that of your note were yielding on the date of
your loan transaction.8 "
The taxpayer borrower could not be prejudiced by this simplifi-
caton. Analysis of his particular creditworthiness could only pro-
duce a higher k, and therefore, more dividend income. On the
other hand, the Service would be slightly shortchanged, but it is
134. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1981, at 44, col.3. It is generally felt that loans to the
Treasury are risk free as to default. Thus, the interest rate which the Treasury must pay
need not include the "risk premium" that is present, in varying degrees, in all other interest
rates. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
135. The TBIR, or Treasury Bond Interest Rate, should be the yield on Treasury Bonds
having a principal amount and maturity similar to the IFSL being comminuted. This is the
same rate that is used in Tress. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(i)(A) (1980) to determine whether a
principal shareholder is receiving "reasonable" interest on funds loaned to his corporation.
The TBIR is generally a long-term rate, and should be distinguished from the TNIR which
will be introduced in the next section for valuing demand notes.
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doubtful whether the typical IFSL borrower is anything but a
prime credit risk (so that the spread between his "real" k and the
TBIR would not be intolerably great). More importantly, the im-
position of any tax at all is a significant improvement over present
practice. " "
B. The Demand Note
All of the reported cases, save two, 37 involve demand notes. The
interest-free demand note is apparently commonplace. The term
note is the exception. This apparent preference for demand notes
is understandable. A term note commits the borrower to fixed re-
payment. A demand note gives the borrower maximum freedom of
action, so long as he controls when the lender will make its de-
mand. This, of course, is the beauty of an IFSL. The shareholder-
borrower controls the corporation and therefore the timing of the
demand. He repays when he wishes, perhaps when the corporation
needs funds, or perhaps when minority shareholders complain, or
perhaps when the Internal Revenue Service calls the loans into
question. If the Simpson Deans and Joseph Creels are typical of
shareholder-borrowers, it appears that demand may never be made
by the controlled corporation.
If anything, the demand borrower's benefit may be greater than
a term borrower's benefit. A greater benefit should result in a
greater tax. Unfortunately, the valuation formula fails us here. A
demand note, lacking a certain term, also lacks a value for N.
Without a value for N, the formula is useless.
This difficulty could be met by inventing some presumptive term
for the loan, and using that presumptive N in the valuation
formula. 38 Or a wait-and-see approach could be devised whereby
136. Odyssey, supra note 19, at 469-70 reaches precisely this point as the desirable eco-
nomic result. It too concludes that Dean and Greenspun hold otherwise. See also, Odyssey
at 482-86.
137. See Marsh and Greenspun, supra note 94.
138. One approach to finding a term would be to look to the repayment experience of
the particular shareholders involved. By the time a case reaches litigation, or even the audit
stage, the minimum term of the loan is ascertainable merely by seeing how much time has
passed since the borrowing. If other demand loans had been made, one could determine the
average length of time demand loans tended to be outstanding. The resulting figures could
be used to generate a presumptive term, which in turn could be used to calculate the note's
value. A sterner (but perhaps more realistic) approach would presume that the loan would
remain outstanding as long as possible; that is, until the death of the borrower. A term, and
the consequent value of the note, could be determined with reference to mortality tables.
An even more drastic approach is suggested, once again, by the regulations under § 385.
There, if a principal shareholder advances funds to his corporation by means of a demand
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actual repayment would be the occasion for amending the bor-
rower's tax return for the year in which the loan was made. The
former approach is unnecessarily arbitrary. The latter is burden-
some and would require an amendment to the Code's statute of
limitations.
There is an intuitive feeling that the benefit conferred by the
demand note is a continuing benefit, instead of one fixed and real-
ized at the moment the loan is closed. The lender's continued for-
bearance is the key to the demand borrower's benefit. A lender ad-
vancing a large sum on an interest-free demand note pulls an
elaborate purse-on-the string joke if, hours after the closing, it de-
mands that the borrower immediately repay. The same initial
transaction can, by the lender's lengthy abstinence, produce a
benefit nearly equivalent to a no-strings cash grant." 9
All this means that the lender's inaction produces the economic
benefit, so that inaction must be legally operative if the federal
income tax consequences are to reflect an IFSL's economic reali-
ties. The point is this: At the inception of a demand IFSL one can-
not predict what benefit will ultimately be realized by the bor-
rower. It depends upon how long the loan remains outstanding and
upon the TIR prevailing during that time.
1. Inaction as a legally operative event.
To begin our analysis, we must acknowledge that the benefit of a
demand IFSL accrues ratably over the period of its existence,
whatever that period might eventually be. As a first step, let us
note bearing less than a "reasonable" rate of interest, then the loan is generally character-
ized as an equity contribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(l)(1) (1980). If this approach were
adopted in cases of transfers from corporations to shareholders, a non-interest-bearing de-
mand note would be treated as involving no indebtedness whatsoever. The entire "loan"
proceeds would be treated as a dividend distribution in the year of disbursement, and any
eventual "repayment" as a contribution to capital, increasing the shareholder's basis in his
stock interest in the corporation but giving rise to no interest deduction whatever. Indeed,
this is precisely the result when the Commissioner successfully attacks an interest-free
shareholder loan so lacking in formalities that it is recharacterized as a disguised dividend.
See, BirrKER, supra note 90, at 7-31.
139. Suppose A borrows $100,000, interest-free, from X when interest rates are 12%.
There is an expectation, ultimately borne out, that demand will be made in 50 years. A
invests $346 in a 50-year certificate of deposit yielding the going rate of 12%. Ignoring the
tax imposed on the interest, A's, investment will grow to $100,000 in 50 years. The economic
benefit of a cash grant ($100,000) is virtually indistinguishable from the economic benefit of
a 50 year loan ($100,000 - $346 funding cost = $99,654). If we assume a 50% tax on inter--
est income, the after-tax yield becomes 6%. Even at a 6% buildup, only $5,429 need be
invested today to yield $100,000 in 50 years.
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look at what happens economically when demand is not made. As-
sume a $100,000 demand IFSL between B and L with an under-
standing between B and L that L's demand may be made only
upon anniversaries of the original borrowing. In other Words, L
grants B a one-year IFSL, with the possibility that the term may
be extended (by L's inaction) for another one-year period, which in
turn may be extended indefinitely in one year increments. If the
TIR remains a constant 11.1% over the period of years in which
the loan is outstanding, then the value of B's note in the hands of
L looks like this:
FIGURE 4
Value of B's Demand Note in Hands of L
S Value
100,000
5 Time (in years)
When L first advances $100,000 in exchange for B's note having
a fair market value of $90,000, we have seen that this apparent
loan of $100,000 is in substance two things: first, a real loan of$90,000; and second, a $10,000 side payment. "4 Since the relation-
ship between B and L is that of dominant shareholder and con-
trolled corporation, the $10,000 side payment is characterized as a
dividend.
The question to be answered now is: What happens on the first
anniversary when L forgoes its right to demand repayment? L's
inaction has extended the IFSL for at least another year. The
value of L's property, (B's note),14 1 has fallen from $100,000 to
140. See generally supra Part I(A),
141. Under the hornbook law of bills and notes it is firmly established that "[a) promis-
sory undertaking to pay money is not property in the hands of the person who makes thepromise ... where the paper has never been negotiated." 11 Am. JUR. 2d Bills and Notes§ 101, at 140 (1963). Common law notions equate this promise to pay as a "mere blank
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$90,000. This decline in L's net worth is mirrored by an increase in
B's net worth. On the anniversary date B could have been called
upon to pay $100,000 at once, while on the next day he could make
full provision for repayment by a current expenditure of only
$90,000. It would seem that this transfer of $10,000 of net worth
from L to B should be a dividend. The problem is that there is no
transfer of cash or property or documents between L and B. Noth-
piece of paper." Salley v. Terrill, 50 A. 896, 897 (1901). This ancient rule was the tool the
courts used in resolving disputes between innocent holders of stolen negotiable instruments
and the note maker's argument that the theft occurred before delivery. According to the
courts all the innocent holder held was a blank piece of paper, therefore, the note maker
would necessarily prevail. This result is justifiable in that in the absence of a delivery of a
note, delivery being essential to negotiability, the risk of loss for policy reasons should fall
on the purchaser.
This common law rule has been quoted in tax cases involving disputes resulting from
employer's deductions for promissory notes delivered to a qualified retirement plan. Slay-
maker Lock Co., 18 T.C. 1001, 1006 (1952), rev'd, Sachs v. Comm'r, 208 F.2d 313 (3d Cir.
1953).
The offhand reference to the common law rule should not become the tail wagging the
dog. The law of dividend distributions shows that the Code and regulations presuppose that
a promissory note is property in the moments before delivery by the maker. To illustrate,
suppose that parent corporation (P) owns all the stock of subsidiary corporation (S). If S
distributes a cash dividend to P then the amount of the dividend is the amount of cash
distributed. I.R.C. § 301(b)(1)(B). But if S distributes a property dividend, say marketable
IBM stock with a basis of $1,000 and fair market value of $10,000, then different rules
apply. Under § 301(b)(1)(B) of the Code, the amount of the distribution is the lesser of the
fair market value of the property, or its adjusted basis in the hands of S. To complete the
pattern, under § 301(d)(2) of the Code, P's basis in the property dividend is, again, the
lesser of fair market value of the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of S. Thus, if S
distributes the IBM stock, then: (i) the amount of the distribution is $1,000; and (ii) P's
basis in the IBM stock is also $1,000.
A second example is needed to make the point. If P receives a second property dividend
from S, this time marketable shares of Exxon, and if we know that the basis of the shares in
the hands of P is the $200,000 fair market value of the shares, then we may say confidently
that S's basis in the Exxon shares was at least $200,000. If S's basis were less than $200,000
the lower of basis or market rule of § 301(d)(2) would operate to give P a less than $200,000
basis in the Exxon stock.
Treasury Reg. §§ 1.301-1(d) and 1(h)(1973) provide that the amount of a note dividend,
and the basis of a dividended note in the hands of a corporate shareholder, respectively, are
the fair market value of the note. If S distributes to P, as a dividend, its promissory note
having a face amount and fair market value of $100,000, then under the quoted regulation
the amount of the distribution and P's basis in S's note is $100,000. Under § 301's lesser-of-
basis-or-value rule this can happen if, and only if, S's basis in its own note is at least
$100,000.
A corporate taxpayer, then, has basis in its own obligations. Basis is something peculiar to
property-indeed, one plausible definition of property is "that which has, or is susceptible
of having, basis." If a promissory note is property in the hands of a corporate maker it
should be property in the hands of an individual maker.
It is a matter of indifference whether the note is treated as property or is simply some--
thing very like property, which, for purposes of analyzing bargain borrowing, will be treated
as if it were property.
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ing happened.
Or did it? Again L has extended the note for at least a year. In
other words, L has unilaterally modified the terms of the loan in a
way benefitting B. If we view the modification as the granting of a
new loan, then L has accepted property (B's note) worth $90,000 in
satisfaction of a debt of $100,000. This should be treated no differ-
ently from B satisfying an obligation to pay $100,000 with a cash
payment of $90,000. In either case B realizes cancellation of in-
debtedness income, which the regulations specify is treated as divi-
dend income because the shareholder-corporation relationship is
also one of debtor-creditor. 142
Thus, B should realize $10,000 of dividend income at the time
the loan is made, and then again on each anniversary that passes
without repayment. The first year's dividend income results from a
$10,000 discrepancy between the purchase price of property
($100,000) and its fair market value ($90,000). Dividends received
in subsequent years are of the same amount, $10,000, but arise for
a different reason: B is being granted a partial cancellation of his
indebtedness. This fact requires a collateral adjustment to reflect
the fact that a portion of B's cancelled debt is interest, not princi-
pal. This is considered in the next section.
* There are at least two objections that may now be raised. First, a
real life demand note does not incorporate the demand-only-on-
anniversary feature. Second, there is something troublesome about
finding cancellation of indebtedness income where at all times B is
obligated to repay the same $100,000.
The first objection may be cured by cutting the period which
must pass before L may demand repayment to an arbitrarily small
unit of time; for example, a day. Each day that passes without de-
mand by L permits B to delay repayment until tomorrow. At some
point each day (presumably the latest hour in which L could both
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(m)(1973) holds that the cancellation of shareholder indebted-
ness by a corporation is treated as a dividend to the borrowing shareholder. Cancellation of
indebtedness income results when the debtor's obligation is worth less than its face value, a
condition which may arise either because of a change in interest rates, or because of a
change in the apparent ability of the debtor to repay (or by a combination of both factors).
See note 30, supra. Cancellation of indebtedness in the latter context is often excluded from
income, probably because the enhanced ability to pay is more apparent than real in the case
of a financially distressed debtor. See, e.g.Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1940); Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937). Cancellation of indebtedness income
arising from changes in interest rates, where the debtor's ability to pay is not in question,
remains unaffected by these exceptions, and is generally fully taxable. The interest-free
shareholder loan situation generally involves no prospective insolvency of the shareholder-
borrower, so none of the exceptions to the rule of full taxation should be available to him.
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demand and receive payment) B's note falls in value from $100,000
to the present value of the right to receive $100,000 tomorrow.
Very short term interest rates do exist. Indeed the Treasury De-
partment is constantly borrowing in the short-term market to ob-
tain cash necessary to run its day-to-day operations.14 8 Again, no
prejudice to the taxpayer could result if we were to assume that
market forces would cause the taxpayer's short term paper to be
priced so as to yield the "TNIR," the current market interest on
very short term Treasury notes. This daily interest rate is near
0.035% under current market conditions. Using the valuation
formula, we find that:
$100,000
Value = = $99,965
1 + 0.00035
When these daily dividends of $35 ($100,000 - $99,965) are added
together for an entire year, B would have annual dividend income
of $35 X 365 = $12,775. The value of B's note over time would
look like a very fine sawtooth curve:
FIGURE 5
Value of B's Demand Note In Hands of L
S Valu 4 10....
.. . . . . . . . . . . .. .
100,00096
0 1 2 3 4 5 Time IOn years)
The calculation of a daily dividend along the lines just suggested
would involve intolerable complexity. Each day's dividend would
be calculated by using that day's yield figure for the shortest term
Treasury notes available, a number which tends to fluctuate during
the course of an entire year. A very close approximation of the sum
143. See, e.g., Wall St. J. Apr. 22, 1981, at 44, col.3.
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of the daily dividends can be found much more simply by using
the valuation formula for a one-year note setting N equal to one
and k equal to the last year's average yield on short-term Treasury
notes, a number which the Treasury could easily determine each
year and publish in its instructions accompanying tax returns. It
can be shown that very little error is introduced by this
simplification.144
144. Let the daily TNIR (current TNIR/365) on any day equal x i. The daily dividend is
1
Balance (1 - ). For the year total dividend income would be:
1 +x i
365 1
D = Balancex Z7 (1 - ) (Eq. 1)
i=1 1+ x i
Using an average TNIR, 1, would produce a yearly dividend of:
1
D = Balance(I- ) (Eq. 2)
l+i
The question is whether fluctuations in xi will be so large as to make Equations 1 and 2
unequal to each other. If xi is constant over the years, Equation (1) becomes:
365 1
Balancex X (1 -- )
i=1 + X i
1
Balance x 365 x (1- )
1 +x i
1
By algebraic manipulation, this reduces to D = Balance (1 - ) If x i does
1 + 365x i
not fluctuate, then i = 365 xi. So, equation 2 becomes:
1
D =Balance ( 1-
1 + 365xi
In practice, to give an extreme example, suppose B owes $1 million for the first six months
of the year when the TNIR was 2%. At midyear B repays $800,000 and the TNIR jumps to
16%. By averaging both the loan amount [1/2 ($1,000,000 + $200,000) = $600,000] and the
interest rate [1/2 (2% + 16%) = 9%] the borrower's dividend would be $600,000
(1 - - ) = $49,500. But if each half of the year were treated separately, the borrower's
dividend would be only 1
1
+ 1/2 [ $200,000 (1 - 1 ) ]
1.16
= $19,600 + 27,600
= $47,200.
The difference, even under these exaggerated suppositions is a modest $2,300.
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The second objection is more subtle. How can we say that B ex-
periences cancellation of indebtedness income when he is at all
times obligated to repay $100,000? The answer lies in the fact that,
while it is true that B must always pay $100,000, it is never true
that all of the $100,000 is attributable to the repayment of a
$100,000 loan. At the end of year 1, we may determine that B bor-
rowed only $90,000, not $100,000. If he repays at the end of year 1,
he is paying $90,000 of principal and $10,000 of interest (the
amount of interest which would accrue on a $90,000 loan at a
TNIR of 11.1%). If the loan is extended another year, then B has
satisfied his obligation to pay $100,000 by giving property worth
only $90,000; $10,000 of his debt is cancelled. At the time of can-
cellation his debt consisted of a 9:1 ratio of principal to accrued
interest. Since all the dollars are fungible, for every $10 of debt
discharged, $9 is attributable to principal and $1 to accrued inter-
est. Immediately after the cancellation, B's note consists of $81,000
of principal and $9,000 of accrued interest. During the next year
interest will accrue at the assumed TNIR of 11.1% on both princi-
pal and accrued interest, so that at the end of year two B's note
will consist of $81,000 of principal and $19,000 of accrued interest.
In short, while the total indebtedness of $100,000 remains con-
stant, the mixture of principal and interest keeps shifting. Princi-
pal grows smaller, and interest larger. It is the lowering of the prin-
cipal amount owed which triggers discharge of indebtedness
income. The tax law must treat reductions of the principal amount
of indebtedness, as distinguished from the discharge of an obliga-
tion to pay interest, as a taxable event if the law is to be internally
consistent in its treatment of borrowers.
To illustrate the need, suppose Li advances B1 $100,000 on a
demand note bearing an arm's-length interest rate. Bl's note is
worth a full $100,000. There is no initial side payment. BI recog-
nizes no gross income. Suppose some time later, just prior to Ll's
making demand for repayment, Li modifies the terms of the note.
Principal will be cut to $40,000, and the remaining $60,000 will be
labelled additional accrued interest. If the law ignores this change,
and contents itself with the fact that B1 must still repay $100,000,
then B1 will receive an interest deduction under section 163 when
he repays what is now $40,000 of principal and $60,000 of accrued
interest. Since B1 realized no gross income when he borrowed
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$100,000, he should receive no deduction when he repays it. If the
law of borrowing is not to become riddled by yet another loophole,
then either the modification must be deemed to create $60,000 of
cancellation of indebtedness income to B1, or the modification it-
self must be disregarded. The latter alternative seems preferable
for Bl's case, for the modification of the terms reeks of artificiality.
But in the case of the IFSL, the former approach is preferable in
that it more accurately reflects economic reality: The slow and
gradual accretion of benefit resulting from the endless extension of
the demand IFSL.
If a distinction is attemped on the grounds that Li physically
changed the document while L, the demand IFSL lender, did noth-
ing, the response must be that inaction is a modification. Note that
if L were to sell B's interest-free demand note to an outsider, then
there can be little question but that the outsider would make his
call as soon as title passes.1, 5 The decision not to seek immediate
repayment of a demand loan on terms unfavorable to the lender
must have a motive different from the desire of the lender to maxi-
mize his return.
2. The Nature of the Obligation Being Discharged
It was just suggested that over the life of a demand IFSL, the
admixture of principal and interest keeps shifting towards interest.
Whether approached on a meticulous day-to-day basis (where each
day $35 of total indebtedness is being cancelled) or instead ap-
proached on a simplified year-by-year basis (where each year
$12,775 of indebtedness is cancelled) the result is the same. The
real loan amount keeps shrinking, while more and more interest
accrues at the current market rate, on whatever principal remains
undischarged.
An example will help illustrate the changing admixture of princi-
pal and interest. Suppose that L advances $100,000 to B pursuant
to a demand IFSL. The loan will remain outstanding for five years,
at which time L will demand repayment. Finally, assume that the
TNIR will remain a constant 11.1% over this five-year priod. In
145. The Seventh Circuit, in holding that the federal gift tax does not reach interest-free
demand notes made to a family member, reasoned: "since the (holder) could require the
notes to be repaid on demand, there is no reason to expect that the fair value of the promise
to repay would be substantially less than the face amount of the loans." Crown v. Commis-
sioner, 585 F.2d 234, 236 (7th Cir. 1978).
This is simply another way of looking at the fact that failure to demand repayment is
evidence of a non-arm's-length transaction.
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each of the five years B will realize dividend income of $10,000.
After the first year this constant $10,000 of dividend income arises
because B's indebtedness is being cancelled. The total $10,000 dis-
charge is applied pro rata between principal and then-accrued in-
terest, a configuration which changes year-by-year. The results are
expressed graphically." 6
FIGURE 6
' Mixture of Principal and Interest over Time for $100,000 Demand IFSL,
.TNIR = 11.1%
Shaded portion = Principal; Lined portion = Interest
$ Value
100,000 l
80,000
70,000
60,000
3 4 5 Time (in years)
146. See notes 161-62, infra, and accompanying text. At the end of each year, the total
discharge of $10,000 is apportioned between the then-existing components of principal and
interest. The value of the note is always $100,000 at the end of a year, and $90,000 at the
beginning of the next to reflect the $10,000 decline in value. In tabular form, the numbers
over the entire five-year period look like this:
NOTE PROPORTIONS
90,000
90,000
81,000
81,000
72,900
72,900
65,600
65,600
59,000
59,000
Accrued
Interest
0
10,000
9,000
19,000
17,100
27,100
24,400
34,400
31,000
41,000
DISCHARGE ($10,000) TOTAL
Principal
9,000
8,100
7,300
6,600
--Repayment-
The beginning of the year balances are reached by subtracting the listed "discharge" num-
bers from the preceding end-of-the-year balance.
Period Principal Interest
Beginning of
Year 1
End of Y1
BO Y2
EO Y2
BO Y3
EO Y3
BO Y4
EO Y4
BO Y5
EO y5.
1,000
1,900
2,700
3,400
OF NO INTEREST
All the while B's promise to pay $100,000 remains evidenced by
his original demand note, an instrument which by its terms allo-
cated the entire $100,000 to principal. The continuing benefit ap-
proach simply fractures the $100,000 promise into its two economic
components. The principal keeps decreasing (and the interest com-
ponent increasing), but at an ever-slower rate. The numbers them-
selves may be familiar to some readers, for the note's unpaid prin-
cipal follows precisely the same course as the adjusted basis of an
asset acquired for $100,000 and depreciated over a twenty-year
period using the double-declining balance method. 41
With little more complication, the same analysis can be applied
to TNIRs which change from year to year. For example, assume
that same $100,000 loan and the same repayment at the end of the
fifth year where the TNIR varies arbitrarily as follows:
Year TNIR (Year's average yield on
short-term Treasury notes)
1 11.1 percent
2 20 percent
3 6 percent
4 10 percent
5 15 percent
The value of B's note and the proportion consisting of principal is
illustrated in Figure 7:
147. Double-declining balance depreciation is authorized by I.R.C. § 167(b)(2) and de-
scribed in Tress. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(b)(1964). Under this method "a uniform rate is applied
each year to the unrecovered cost or other basis of the property." Id.. The rate is twice the
reciprocal of the useful life (here, 2 times 1/20 = 10%). Salvage value is ignored. Id. Sub-
tracting 10% of the unrecovered balance from the previous unrecovered balance is precisely
the same process occurring here. In both cases, the previous balance is multiplied by 90%.
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FIGURE 7
Mixture of Principal and Interest over Time$100,000 Demand IFSL, TNIR Varying
Shaded portion = Principal; Lined portion = Interest
$ Value
10,000
70,0W
50,000 ii~i
1 2 3 4 5 Time (In years)
It has been shown that the cancellation of principal produces
cancellation of indebtedness income. We must now consider the
consequences of cancelling the obligation to pay interest. Crane v.
Commissioner,148 the landmark Supreme Court case, holds that the
cancellation of an obligation to pay interest gives rise to a deduc-
tion. Crane determined the role of nonrecourse liabilities in figur-
ing an owner's gain realized upon the sale of encumbered property.
The taxpayer sold an apartment building - earlier inherited from
her husband - for $3,000 cash, but subject to a mortgage lien of
some $271,000 ($255,000 principal and $16,000 interest).149 The
Commissioner successfully argued that the taxpayer's amount real-
ized included the $255,000 unpaid mortgage principal.'50 Discus-
sion of the accrued interest was relegated to footnote 6:
The Commissioner explains that only the principal amount,
rather than the total present debt secured by the mortgage, was
deemed to be a measure of the amount realized, because the dif-
ference was attributable to interest due, a deductible item.151
In short, cancellation of the obligation to pay interest produces off-
148. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id. at 4 n.6.
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setting items of income and deduction. Crane's exclusionary treat-
ment of accrued interest is applicable to B's discharge from his ob-
ligation to pay interest.'6 '
When L fails to demand repayment, the decline in the value of
B's note in the hands of L amounts to a discharge of a portion of
B's debt. This produces cancellation of indebtedness income. Part
of the debt cancelled is principal and part interest. Under Crane
the discharge of interest creates an offsetting deduction. B's net
dividend income is simply the amount of principal discharged.
Two consequences of this treatment deserve attention. First, the
tax consequences of a demand IFSL become very closely
equivalent to those experienced by a term note borrower. 63 Sec-
ond, by giving B an annual interest deduction to the extent that
his obligation to pay interest is cancelled, B's aggregate net divi-
dend income realized over the course of the demand loan's life will
always exactly equal his interest deduction received in the year of
repayment."" This seems proper, because there is zero net passage
of dollars between the parties in a repaid interest-free loan. The
tax consequences, if they are to be correlated to real world dollars,
should - and here do - follow economic consequenes.' 55 This is
152. The reader might well be alarmed by this assertion. After all, it is the Tax Court's
use of a "wash" analysis in IFSL cases that has produced nearly twenty years of confusion
in the law of interest-free borrowing. But this article has not waged war against the Dean
rationale only to revive the error in a slightly transmuted form. The constructive interest
deduction resulting from the cancellation of an obligation to pay interest admittedly does
"wash out" the cancellation of indebtedness income. The flaw in Dean lies in its application
of the wash rationale, not in the proposition that some pairs of transactions cancel one
another.
153. Recall the example of the borrower receiving $100,000 pursuant to a demand note,
which he repays in five years, when the TNIR is 11.1%. The principal of his note is reduced
in five stages to $59,000. If the TBIR were also 11.1% at the time of the borrowing and if B
had borrowed the same $100,000 on a five year note, his dividend would have been: $100,000
- $100,000/(1.111)5 = $41,000.
154. In any year the borrower's gross dividend income does two things: first, it dis-
charges principal; and second, it discharges accrued interest. If the discharge of interest is
held to produce no net tax effect pursuant to Crane's exclusionary treatment, then any
year's net dividend income is simply the decline in principal. Restated, each year the princi-
pal declines by net dividend income. In the year of repayment the borrower receives an
interest deduction measured by the excess of the face amount of his note over the amount of
his note then consisting of principal. This difference is formed by, and must be exactly
equal to, the sum of all prior years' net dividend income.
155. Odyssey, supra note 19, begins its analysis of the demand note by considering gra-
tuitous transfers. These are analyzed under the principles set forth in the Supreme Court's
decision in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). The gratuitous demand loan is viewed as
a revocable transfer, and the lender is subject to tax on the income generated by the loan
proceeds. Odyssey at 489-92. Since the borrower's actual income from the loan proceeds is
usually difficult to trace, the authors suggest using a proxy: the going prime interest rate. Id.
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not to be confused with a Dean wash. There, no tax is ever pay-
able. Here, tax is paid in early years, only to be refunded by the
government (assuming a constant marginal tax rate) in a later
year. In the meantime the borrower makes an interest-free loan to
the govenment. It seems intuitively proper to tax the interest-free
borrower by causing him to make an interest-free loan to the tax-
ing authority. This is what happens under the advocated analysis.
CONCLUSION
"[A]n interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the bor-
rower.""" This, Dean's holding, is the law. It is the law not be-
cause of the demands of either logic 5 7 or policy e8 , but instead be-
cause Dean's seductive analogy has captured the law of interest-
free borrowing by twenty years of adverse possession. It is ludi-
crous, when "[s]oaring interest rates have all but destroyed the
dream of home ownership for many Americans,"'1 9 for the law to
at 492-93.
Non-gratuitous interest free loans are then considered, first the compensatory loan, Id. at
501-04 and then IFSL's. Id. at 504-05. After considering, but rejecting, a Corliss analysis,
Odyssey views the compensatory loan as follows:
If a demand loan was interest bearing rather than interest free, the interest debt
would accrue as each moment of time elapsed without demand for repayment. If,
simultaneously with the accrual of interest on an interest-bearing demand loan,
the interest debt was forgiven, that forgiveness would properly be viewed as the
equivalent of an additional salary payment which is simultaneously repaid as in-
terest when due .... An interest-free demand loan to an employee is thus the
equivalent of a series of additional salary payments which are immediately paid to
discharge continually accruing interest . . .. Put another way, it is the equivalent
of the employee borrowing money on an interest-bearing demand note from a
third party and the employer discharging the employee's interest obligation as it
accrues.
Id. at 502. Odyssey concludes its analysis of compensatory interest-free demand notes as
follows: The employee realizes gross income measured by interest imputed at an arm's-
length rate, but receives a deduction in the same amount (unless the facts of the case pre-
clude the borrower's hypothetical interest deduction, presumably because the proceeds are
invested in tax-exempt securities). In short, the transaction washes, both to the borrower
and to the lender. Id. at 504.
Demand IFSL's receive similar analysis. The borrower realizes no net income (the im-
puted interest income is cancelled by a hypothetical interest expense deduction). Id. at 504.
The corporate lender, however, is taxed under the principles of Corliss. Id. at 505.
This article stresses that the demand borrower does realize income, but under a cancella-
tion of indebtedness income (partially offset by an interest deduction under Crane) theory.
Odyssey, in finding a "wash" at the borrower level, agrees with the result in Dean.
156. Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961) (footnote omitted).
157. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
159. See Wall St.J., Apr. 22, 1981, at 31, col. 3.
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say that a taxpayer borrowing large sums without interest has real-
ized no taxable economic benefit. Yet this is Dean's result.
The Tax Court's 1979 Creel decision suggested a shifting of judi-
cial attitude towards IFSL's. Subsequent events indicate otherwise.
The first appellate decision considering IFSL's wholeheartedly em-
braces Dean's logic; Creel is not even cited.160 The Treasury De-
partment itself now proposes Regulations which would adopt Dean
hook, line and sinker,'16 an action bewildering in view of the Ser-
vice's recent aggressive litigating position and continued non-
acquiesence in Dean.
This article has suggested a practical approach to the taxation of
IFSL's,1 2" one based on the economic reality that the borrower's
note must have a fair market value less than the amount of the
loan. The key to understanding IFSL's lies in valuation. The bor-
160. See Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
161. Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.61-19(c), ex. 11, note 67 supra, holds that a bargain loan creates
no gross income when the employee-borrower invests the proceeds in taxable obligations.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-17(d), ex. 5, holds otherwise when the proceeds are used by the
borrower to purchase tax-exempt municipal bonds. This is, of course, Dean and its concur-
ring opinion. See supra notes 72 and 88. It is ironic that these same proposed regulations
are otherwise very aggressive. For the first time it is proposed that both employee merchan-
dise discounts (if in excess of $200 per year) and discount travel by airline employees be
subject to income tax. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-19(b)(1) and -17(d). See supra notes 68 and
69.
162. The reasoning applied in this article for the valuation and taxation of interest-free
loans made by corporations to shareholders is equally applicable to interest-free loans in
other situations, such as the compensation or gift tax situation. In the compensation area,
the Tax Court in Greenspun applied the same rationale as in Dean, to find no taxable
income to the recipient of the loan, even though the court found that the purpose for the
low interest loan was clearly compensatory. In the gift tax area, for example, the side pay-
ment which is considered a dividend in the shareholder situation becomes a gift for gift tax
purposes when interest-free loans are made between related individuals.
Presently, the question of whether an interest-free or low interest loan constitutes a tax-
able gift by the lender is unsettled. The Service's position is that such loans between related
individuals constitute taxable gifts, regardless of whether the loan is repayable on demand
or at a specified time. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 480. The courts, however, have disagreed
with the Service's position when the loan is repayable on demand. Crown v. Commissioner,
585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. U.S., 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966). Where the
loan between related taxpayers is at a rate below the prevailing rate at the time, and the
loan is for a definite term, the Tax Court has ruled that a taxable gift exists. Estate of
Berkman v. Commissioner, 38 TCM (CCH) 183 (1979).
The considerations and policy reasons for taxing or not taxing interest-free loans in the
gift tax area may be different from those present in the income tax area. A discussion of
such difference, if any, is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Crown, supra and arti-
cles criticizing that decision. Note, however, that the reasoning applied by the Tax Court in
Dean and Greenspun in order to find no taxable income to the recipient of the loan-no
taxable income because of an assumed interest deduction-is not applicable in the gift tax
area, since the individual on whom the tax would be imposed would never be entitled to an
interest deduction.
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rower's note must be valued, and the difference between the note's
value and the loan amount is dividend income to the borrower.
This occurs either in a single spike of income in the case of a term
note, or in a continuous flow of dividend income in the case of a
demand note.
The valuation approach might be criticized for its complexity
and disregard for precedent. The complexity objection is unwar-
ranted. While the graphs and equations of Part IV may appear for-
midable, the amount of dividend income can be measured using
techniques found in existing regulations. Bargain loans can be val-
ued pursuant to this article's suggestions by using techniques less
burdensome than those used in valuing loans flowing in the other
direction: from the shareholder to the corporation. 16" The dividend
income generated by a demand note requires a second calculation
almost identical to that used in figuring declining balance depreci-
ation.1" In short, the advocated valuation approach is well within
the outer limits of complexity bounding existing law.
The stare decisis objection, the oft-repeated suggestion that
change is now a job for Congress, ignores the Supreme Court's
holding in LoBue:1"5 Appellate courts, especially the Supreme
Court, are not powerless to correct long-standing errors of the Tax
Court. Justice Black dismissed twenty years of established Tax
Court law in holding that there was "no statutory basis" for the
then well-established proprietary stock option doctrine.6 6 The
similarities between IFLS's and LoBue are profound. Both involve
patterns of tax avoidance based upon the refusal of the Tax Court
to engage in a valuation of property transferred between related
parties having an incentive to set an artificial transfer price as a
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1)(ii) (1980) contemplates that any loan from a shareholder
to a corporation not bearing a "reasonable" interest rate must be valued "by using present
value and standard bond tables." The difference between the note's issue price and its fair
market value (the side payment in the case of IFSL's) is treated either as a contribution of
capital (if the shareholder pays too much for the corporation's note) or as a dividend (if the
shareholder pays too little). See Tress. Reg. § 1.385-3(a)(3). These regulations contemplate
a measurement of the value of corporate debt obligations by using a discount rate which
takes into account all factors bearing on value, including the debtor's ability to pay. Tress.
Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(1). This article suggests using a simplified discount rate, a TBIR for term
notes and a TNIR for demand notes, which is readily ascertainable from regularly published
financial data. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(e)(2)(i)(A) (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury
to determine the TBIR periodically for purposes of the "safe harbor" rule governing "rea-
sonable" interest rates).
164. See supra note 147.
165. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
166. Id. at 247.
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means of disguising a side payment. Both involve the Tax Court's
refusal to adjust the artificial transfer price. Both involve a sub-
stantial threat to the tax base. And both may be easily cured by a
Supreme Court decision broadly mandating a valuation approach
with details to be worked out below.' 67
One final objection may be raised. The suggested approach is
doubtless itself vulnerable to manipulation and circumvention. For
example, term loans might be made to shareholders at a time when
the corporation had no earnings and profits, thereby giving the
shareholder an eventual interest deduction without any current ad-
verse tax effect.' " Or a demand IFSL might be repaid at the end
of each year, only to be re-borrowed at the beginning of the next.6 9
To this the author demurs. There are very few final solutions in
tax law, but there may be structural improvements. The first of the
suggested evasions is merely a new twist on an old technique of
exploiting Code section 301(c)(2). The latter merely raises one of
King Arthur's three fundamental problems: 70 what to do when the
subjects flee the jurisdiction on taxing day. Surely a system wres-
tling with this problem is preferable to the existing one where
stripe-painting beats the tax.
167. The Court remanded LoBue to the Tax Court with directions for it to figure out
both how much income was realized, and when it was realized. Id. at 250.
168. If the corporate lender has no earnings and profits, then the side payment would be
treated first, as a non-taxable return of capital to the extent of the shareholder's basis in his
stock invested, and then as long-term capital gain. See, I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(2) and (3). Cf. I.R.C.
§ 312(i). Thus, no current tax would be payable if the side payment portion of the IFSL was
less than the shareholder's basis in his stock. The eventual "free" interest deduction upon
repayment would be matched by an equal amount of interest income to the corporation.
169. The idea is to keep the IFSL off the corporation's balance sheet or schedule L of
Form 1120. This would make auditing more difficult, but perfectly detectable by a look
through the firm's bank statements. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g)(5)(vi)(1980).
170. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text, supra.
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